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Summary 
International efforts to achieve goals such as universal energy access and climate change mitigation 
are expected to stimulate billions of dollars of private financial flows to developing countries for clean 
(energy) technology transfer investments. Policies for realising these ambitions are framed in terms 
of neoliberal development orthodoxy, but critical voices call for more active state intervention based 
on arguments showing that free markets alone will not deliver the needed technologies and other 
innovations with the urgency required. This sets up the potential for a confrontation of contradictory 
ideologies in the making and implementation of policy: neoliberal orthodoxy at the level of global 
agreements versus state-led developmentalism at the national level. What this will mean for action 
on the ground, as those who promote clean energy access technologies and innovations seek to realise 
their development goals, is an open question. 
This paper analyses the case of the solar photovoltaic (PV) market in Kenya as a way to explore this 
and other issues. The Kenyan PV market is considered one of the most successful off-grid markets in 
the developing world and is often hailed as an exemplar of neoliberal development orthodoxy. 
However, based on reinterpretation of existing STEPS research into the evolution of this market, which 
took a niche theory approach, we argue that the Kenyan PV niche and market would not have 
developed without the support and active intervention of donors, many of whom – paradoxically – 
espouse neoliberal policy prescriptions. Drawing from discursive institutionalism, we develop a 
political economy lens to reinterpret our existing research, and find that the Kenyan PV niche is now 
facing an uncertain future, even as the solar PV market may continue to flourish. 
At a more general level, we reflect on what the case tells us about future encounters between 
neoliberal orthodoxy and more developmentalist aspirations, encounters we might expect to increase 
in the process of realising the policy ambitions noted above. We argue that, if the Kenyan case acts as 
an example of a more general phenomenon, we need to understand policy making in its context, 
paying attention to historical socio-political relations across 'scales' of policy action, from the global 
to the local. The Kenyan case illustrates that action on the ground will likely be the outcome of messy 
negotiated interactions between competing and contradictory ideologies rather than determined 
simply by powerful global forces such as neoliberal hegemony. 
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1. Introduction 
Building pro-poor energy pathways for transformations to sustainability is now one of 17 Sustainable 
Development Goals (SDGs) (UNGA 2015), overlapping with international agreement to avoid 
dangerous climate change (UNFCCC 2015). To realise these ambitions, there are expected to be huge 
quantities of money flowing each year to finance sustainable energy and climate technology transfer 
to developing countries (Ockwell and Byrne 2016a). Whilst these ambitions are welcome, the 
international policy architecture that could help to achieve them is still under construction and the 
promised finance is slow in materialising. Moreover, despite interest in constructing architecture that 
might facilitate more sophisticated interventions than simply hardware-financing through ostensibly 
free markets (Ockwell and Byrne 2016b), the language of the international agreements for the SDGs 
and climate change suggests an acceptance of the continuation of neoliberal capitalism, albeit with a 
limited role for the state. However, given the risky and uncertain nature of the challenges these 
ambitions entail and the public-good nature of the benefits that would ensue, it is likely that highly-
active public sector intervention will be essential. It is clear that profit-seeking private actors alone 
will not succeed in delivering the necessary technologies, products and services through free markets 
that are merely policed by state institutions (Mazzucato 2016; Mazzucato 2013; Perez 2016). If the 
state is to be much more active in building pathways to sustainability then we need to understand 
more clearly the extent to which neoliberal capitalism and what we might call the re-emergence of 
the developmental state will interact, potentially creating new spaces for contestation, conflict and 
tension in the processes through which policy is made in particular places (Hansen and Stepputat 
2001; Leach et al. 2010b; Scoones 2016). 
The purpose of this paper, therefore, is to explore such potential by examining an example of pro-
poor energy-pathway construction and to see what this can tell us about the prospects for state-led 
transformations in pro-poor low carbon energy access under neoliberal hegemony. To do this, we 
revisit previous STEPS Centre research on the evolution of the solar market in Kenya (summarised 
below but see Byrne et al. 2014; Rolffs et al. 2015; Ockwell and Byrne 2016a), a market widely hailed 
as an exemplar of neoliberal capitalist development but, as we argue elsewhere, one that has been 
heavily-dependent on public-sector support (Ockwell et al. forthcoming 2017). In order to identify 
insights relevant to the interactions of neoliberal orthodoxy and potential state-led 
developmentalism, we reinterpret our previous work using a political economy lens, drawing on a 
discursive institutionalist perspective (Schmidt 2008) to construct our political economy framework. 
Furthermore, as our previous work used the strategic niche management (SNM, niche theory) 
approach for its analysis, we take the opportunity to begin synthesising the two perspectives into a 
political economy of niche-building. As a result, the paper seeks to make three main contributions. 
One, as a theoretical contribution, we offer a tentative synthesis between a discursive institutionalist 
political economy and niche theory. This synthesis begins to connect discourse, power, institutional 
inertia and change, and materiality, all interacting in a development context in which different visions 
for pro-poor low-carbon energy access are competing for dominance. Two, as an empirical 
contribution, we show how actors within the Kenyan solar niche, actors within the Kenyan state and 
actors within the neoliberal development regime have all acted strategically in their mutual 
encounters as they have sought to promote their own preferred energy-development pathways. And, 
three, at a more general level, we contribute to debates about the messy realities of policy making in 
particular places, suggesting that we should be cautious about assuming both the 'purity' and 
deterministic power of neoliberal development prescriptions when put into practice. 
Our main argument posits that the evolution of the Kenyan PV niche has relied crucially on donor 
support for interventions that go well beyond what the new institutional economics form of neoliberal 
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capitalism would condone for 'market development' (Jacobson 2004; Woo 2004) to include directed 
technology development and the fostering of other kinds of innovation (Ockwell and Byrne 2016a). In 
doing so, various actors – donors and PV specialists – have created and nurtured a socio-technical 
niche. That is, a space in which experimentation and learning can occur, protected from the full force 
of market competition (Geels 2002; Raven 2005; Smith et al. 2014). A close examination of this niche 
evolution reveals that PV actors in Kenya initially acted strategically to secure protective donor 
resources, framing the need for active interventions in terms acceptable to what Jacobson (2004: 43) 
calls 'neo-liberal policy makers' working according to new institutional economics prescriptions (Woo 
2004). Over time, the narrative these PV actors deployed evolved into one that is itself embracing of 
the new institutional economics prescription for enabling-environments. In parallel with this shifting 
PV actor narrative, Kenyan state actors have evolved an official narrative around PV that has 
converged on the same enabling-environment form. Complicating this narrative, however, state 
actors also implemented an entirely state-funded programme to install PV systems in off-grid schools 
and other public service facilities, eschewing the enabling-environment narrative when confronted 
with a specific context in which private actors were unlikely to find circumstances favourable to profit-
seeking. 
These complex and complicated dynamics provide examples of policy action in particular places and 
contexts, showing how actors negotiate their encounters with different visions of transformational 
change as they seek to realise their preferred development strategy (Hansen and Stepputat 2001; 
Leach et al. 2010b). PV niche actors initially negotiated between their vision for a highly interventionist 
transformational strategy for pro-poor energy access and the neoliberal development regime, but 
they now appear, on the face of it, to have fully adopted the tenets of that regime. Kenyan state actors 
eventually accepted that solar PV could have a role in increasing energy access but they appear to 
have adopted the neoliberal strategy of only providing an enabling-environment, perhaps because it 
means little in the way of committed state resources. And, curiously, neoliberal development actors 
appear to be promoting the enabling-environment narrative whilst providing some resources for 
highly interventionist actions. Although we ourselves accept that the neoliberal hegemony is real and 
powerful, with 'disciplining' effects (Newell and Phillips 2016), our examination of the political 
economy of niche-building around the Kenyan PV market shows that policy action under this 
hegemony is in reality messier than a straightforward imposition by powerful actors of a particular 
ideology. 
Active Kenyan PV niche-building is still ongoing but there are signs that the neoliberal orthodoxy may 
indeed triumph over the more developmentalist approach that has been somewhat discernible so far. 
Having said this, there is another layer of complexity evolving in Kenyan energy governance as the 
impact of Kenya’s new constitution becomes clearer. This has the potential to sweep many more 
actors into the messiness of policy action around energy access, multiplying development visions and 
demands, and potentially multiplying contestations and conflicts about how and what energy access 
should be pursued. How all this will play out is, of course, impossible to predict. Instead, we offer a 
historical political economy examination and analysis of the evolution of the Kenyan PV niche in line 
with Scoones’ argument that we need to, 
'…take account of the historical dynamics of institutional change and the ongoing negotiations 
between different groups…to reveal how directions of change are negotiated through 
complex sociopolitical relations, involving multiple actors over time.' 
Scoones (2016: 307) 
 We trace the dynamics of such relations as they are revealed through PV niche actors seeking 
resources for niche-building and influence over national policy. These actions bring them into contact 
with only certain parts of the Kenyan state and the international development regime. In effect, then, 
we treat the state and development regime in terms of 'a dispersed ensemble of institutional practices 
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and techniques of governance' (Hansen and Stepputat 2001: 14) rather than monolithic entities. This 
allows us to observe how global and local forces interact in relational terms to co-produce specific 
development strategies and outcomes, rather than to assume that powerful global forces are 
deterministic of development pathways. 
We develop our argument as follows. In the next section, we briefly discuss the main concepts we use 
to construct our political economy lens, drawing from discursive institutionalism (Schmidt 2008), 
focussing especially on ideas, interests and institutions (following Kern 2011). Although these three 
categories interact, close attention to ideas in particular helps us to trace and understand the political 
dynamics at work and how these co-produce interests and institutional change. We therefore 
'decompose' further the notion of ideas using an interpretive narratives approach (Leach et al. 2010b; 
Wagenaar 2011). Having laid out our main political economy concepts, we then discuss our 
methodology in Section 3. This includes a justification for the case chosen, some discussion of our 
previous work on the Kenyan PV niche from which this paper draws, and a description of the new 
research work undertaken. In the same section, we discuss briefly the main concepts of niche theory 
and how we reinterpret these using our political economy lens. We complete the methodology section 
with an explanation of how we operationalise the main concepts, and provide a list of questions used 
for interrogating both our previous work and collecting new data. In Section 4 we give our political 
economy account of PV niche-building in Kenya. We offer an analytical discussion of this political 
economy in section 5, reflecting on this analysis and drawing conclusions in Section 6. 
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2. A Political Economy Framework: Ideas, Interests and Institutions 
In this section, we outline our conceptual framework for analysing the interactions of political and 
economic forces at work in a particular context; what we take to be a political economy (Hudson and 
Leftwich 2014: 5). This is a broad definition open to a wide variety of interpretations and approaches 
so we need to develop a more granular set of concepts in order to achieve some useful analytical 
purchase. To do this we follow Kern (2011) who draws on a discursive institutionalist perspective (see, 
for example, Schmidt 2008) that he develops around a combination of discourse, institutions and 
interests, and with which he explains divergent policy making for socio-technical system transitions in 
the UK and the Netherlands. This discursive institutionalist perspective is appropriate given that niche-
building can be characterised as a situation of complexity and uncertainty: it entails risks of various 
kinds as actors experiment with untried socio-technologies in evolving contexts. As such, actors do 
not have clear perceptions of their interests and so are forced to construct them as they act (Kern 
2011: 1120; Hudson and Leftwich 2014: 95). In part, they achieve this construction through discursive 
processes, co-producing meaning from the results of their experiments and wider developments. As 
they construct their interests and meaning they also develop particular understandings of what 
institutional changes are necessary to further realise material developments that will support their 
interests. We discuss these three categories of ideas, interests and institutions briefly below before 
explaining, in the section in the methodology on operationalising our framework, how we incorporate 
concepts from niche theory so that we can reinterpret our previous work to provide a historical 
political economy of niche-building. 
2.1 A Brief Conceptualisation of Ideas, Interests and Institutions 
Ideas are promoted, discussed, negotiated and contested, etc., within discourses (Kern 2011: 1119; 
Mayrhofer and Gupta 2015: 4). And, following Leach et al. (2010b; 2010a), we can analyse discourse 
through the notion of narratives. According to Roe (1991), development narratives offer ways to 
discipline the complexity of the world by simplifying this complexity into plausible stories, making 
them attractive to practitioners as well as, we might argue, wider publics. Narratives remove from 
view certain aspects of the world, and place in view others. A narrative describes where we are at 
present and what is wrong with this (the narrative’s introduction, problem-definition), elaborates a 
way to fix the problem (the narrative’s middle1, development strategy), and what the world will look 
like if the strategy is successful (the narrative’s end, better outcome) (Leach et al. 2010a: 371, after 
Roe 1991). Naess et al. (2015: 536) include 'evidence' when considering narratives, arguing that 
'narratives and evidence' provide a way to examine 'the histories and practices linked to shifting 
discourses, and how these shape and guide policy problems and courses of action. Whilst it is not 
entirely clear what the authors mean by 'evidence' and what counts as such, it is implied by the link 
between 'histories and practices' and 'shifting discourses', referring, perhaps, to the effect histories 
and practices have on discourses, and vice versa. As such, any development (or policy) narrative told 
in a particular place about particular issues will have to be persuasive in that context. In order for this 
to be so, it will appeal to context-specific qualities, for example local2 culture, politics, history, 
economy, and link with other locally-powerful narratives. So, by analysing narratives, we are forced 
                                                          
1 Alternatively, the middle might describe what will happen because of this problem (consequences if nothing is done), and 
the end might elaborate what we should do about it (better development strategy). 
2 Local, here, does not have to mean a sub-national region or nation. We are using it in the sense that those who the teller 
wants to persuade are the locals in that 'space' – the relevant audience. So, the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change (UNFCCC) Conference of the Parties, for example, might include thousands of people from across the world 
but there will still be policy narratives told within this 'locality' that connect with other narratives relevant to the 'culture', 
'language', 'politics, etc., of the United Nations (UN) negotiations. 
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to consider how they achieve (or not) this appeal. Wagenaar (2011: 212-4) offers a way to analyse 
how stories (or, for us, narratives) achieve their appeal when, amongst other things, he argues that 
stories are both subjective and value-laden. They are subjective in the sense that 'good' stories are 
those that engage with universal and timeless themes, which enable readers to identify with the story. 
That is, readers can see in the story their own life-experiences and so are able to fill in the details that 
have been left untold. As readers, we can recognise the characters and the ambiguous situations they 
have to face, make judgements about what the characters do, take sides, and so on. By involving us 
as readers in the moral complexities of the situations presented to us, we get to consider how the 
abstract ideas look in reality. By value-laden, Wagenaar argues that stories depict their characters in 
ways that persuade us to make particular judgements about them – that they are, for example, good 
or bad, right or wrong. We are likely to want to see the 'good guys' win, to support their strategies or 
actions above those of others. In the story, for us to choose sides, there must be a moral dilemma that 
threatens to upset the normal order of things and that dilemma may have been caused by the actions 
of the 'bad guy'. To restore order, someone must act – the good guy, or the bad guy turned good. 
Naess et al. (2015: 536) describe interests, along with politics, as the 'core of classic political economy 
analysis', which emphasise 'the interactions of state and civil society, and different interest groups, 
social segments or classes'. In classic political economy, actors are assumed to be personal-utility 
maximisers but this assumption is critiqued on the basis that it assumes actors pursue rationally their 
known (to themselves) interests. According to this critique, actors do not always know what their 
interests are, especially in contexts characterised by complexity and uncertainty (Kern 2011: 1120; 
Hudson and Leftwich 2014: 95). In such contexts, actors construct their interests along with 
constructing meaning from the various dynamics at play within a discourse (i.e. the interacting shifting 
narratives within a particular discourse), and the opportunities for, and constraints to, their action. 
This does not preclude actors having particular knowable (by them and others) material interests, but 
it may not be clear how these will feature in any potentially realised socio-technical future and, 
therefore, whether the actors will continue to see these as their interests. The point here is that we 
need to be attuned to the way interests themselves evolve in tandem with evolutions in narratives, 
institutions, materiality and context. 
When we are analysing opportunities and constraints in regard to agency, the category institutions is 
relevant. Institutions here refer to both formal and informal (sometimes called non-formal) 'rules' that 
enable or constrain actors’ agency (Kern 2011: 1120). Formal rules include policies, laws, regulations, 
standards, and other generally codified arrangements. Informal rules refer to social norms, cultural 
practices, values, and so on. Institutions are not determining of actors’ agency but when actors wish 
to go beyond what institutions allow or promote they must engage in extra work to make it possible 
(or risk being seen as illegitimate in some way): i.e. they will have to engage in political work to 
persuade others that what they are doing – or wish to do – is acceptable or desirable (Hudson and 
Leftwich 2014: 75–7, and Section 6.2 more generally). This links the category directly to discourse and, 
especially, narratives, where we can see actors attempting to change institutions. And, it also links to 
interests, as actors may be trying to change institutions so that they align with their interests 
(notwithstanding the argument that actors do not always know what their interests are). Agency 
features strongly in this category and Naess et al. (2015) include actors with institutions in their 
analytical approach. 
2.2 Summary of the Political Economy Framework 
In order to achieve a more useful analytical purchase, we 'decompose' the notion of political economy 
into three main categories: ideas, interests and institutions. We take these to be interacting and 
dynamic rather than separate and static. Ideas are central to discourse and so we can conceptualise 
this category in terms of narratives and how they operate. Interests are not necessarily self-evident 
to actors; rather, we conceptualise them as co-produced discursively along with the changing 
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institutional context. Figure 2.1 depicts the main concepts we use to form the framework of our 
political economy perspective. 
Figure 2.1 Political Economy through the Co-production of Ideas, Interests and Institutions 
 
Source: Authors’ construction 
Having sketched the concepts we use to bring some granularity to our notion of political economy, we 
move in the next section to discuss our methodology. This includes some discussion of our previous 
work on the evolution of Kenya’s PV niche, as well as a brief review of niche theory. This review of 
niche theory will help us to complete the construction of our framework for analysing the political 
economy of niche-building before moving on, in Section 4, to recount the particular political economy 
dynamics of the Kenyan PV niche. 
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3. Methodology: Case Selection, Methods and a Political Economy 
of Niche-building 
Before outlining the research strategy, methods and analytical framework, we discuss the rationale 
for choosing the Kenyan PV niche as a case study to explore state-led transformations in pro-poor low 
carbon energy. As part of this rationale, we also provide a brief review of existing STEPS Centre 
research on low carbon energy in Kenya. We draw heavily from this previous research but reinterpret 
it using our political economy of niche-building framework, and so it is helpful to provide a sketch of 
what that research entails. With this existing research in mind, we then describe the research strategy 
and methods used for this paper. Then, as part of developing the analytical framework, we briefly 
review the main concepts in niche theory. Finally, we discuss how we have combined the political 
economy lens conceptualised in Section 2 with these niche theory concepts, as well as how we 
operationalise them for this paper, and how they give rise to the generic questions used to interrogate 
the existing STEPS research and new data collected. 
3.1 Rationale for a Case Study of Solar PV in Kenya 
The bulk of STEPS Centre research on low carbon energy in Kenya is focussed on off-grid solar PV, 
whether as solar home systems (SHSs) or solar portable lanterns (SPLs), and has been conducted using 
the niche theory framework (see Byrne et al. 2014; Rolffs et al. 2014; Rolffs et al. 2015; Ockwell and 
Byrne 2016a; Ockwell et al. forthcoming 2017). In addition, STEPS Centre colleagues, together with 
others, have conducted research on the political economy of low carbon energy in Kenya more 
generally (see Newell et al. 2014; Naess et al. 2015; Newell and Phillips 2016). In the present paper, 
we draw mainly from the work on SHSs and SPLs (especially Byrne et al. 2014; and Ockwell and Byrne 
2016a) but supplement this, where appropriate, by the other work and, of course, with our new data. 
The Kenyan PV niche is a useful case study for several reasons. Solar PV systems of various kinds have 
become increasingly attractive technologies for bringing sustainable energy services to millions across 
the world, promising low-carbon wins, adaptability across scales of provision, simplicity of operation 
and rapidly falling prices (Jacobson 2004; Byrne 2011; Bazilian et al. 2013). In areas of developing 
countries without electricity grids, SHSs and SPLs, many with mobile phone charging functionality, are 
being adopted in rapidly expanding markets (Bloomberg NEF and Lighting Global 2016). One of the 
most vibrant of these is the Kenyan PV market (Rolffs et al. 2015; Turman-Bryant et al. 2015), 
considered one of the most successful per capita off-grid solar markets in the developing world, and 
widely described as a private sector led phenomenon that has achieved its success without subsidy 
and with minimal international 'aid' (for example see Jacobson 2004; Jacobson 2007; and Ondraczek 
2013). As such, it might be characterised as a market-led or perhaps a technology-led transformation 
(Leach et al. 2010b; Scoones 2016). However, our existing research demonstrates that this 'private-
sector-led' characterisation is highly simplified. Since at least the early 1980s, donors have provided 
resources to support the activities of PV actors (mainly those within Kenya but also some from outside) 
who have gradually constructed a socio-technical niche (see below for a discussion of the niche 
concept) around solar technology in Kenya (Byrne 2011; Ockwell and Byrne 2016a; Ockwell et al. 
forthcoming 2017). Without this donor support, we argue, it is unlikely that there would be a 
successful PV market to analyse. 
The case, therefore, offers an example in which there has been a long history of interactions between 
international donors, many of whom could be described as supportive of neoliberal development 
orthodoxy, parts of the Kenyan state, and PV activists interested in promoting SHSs and SPLs as 
potential pro-poor solutions to the off-grid electricity-access challenge. Understanding the dynamics 
of these interactions, and how solar PV pathways have been constructed through them, provides us 
with an opportunity to generate insights relevant to the international policy ambitions of achieving 
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sustainable energy for all and meaningful climate change mitigation. Given that enormous quantities 
of private finance are expected to flow to support such policy ambitions, and that an active public 
sector is likely to be needed to guide, direct and even lead investment (Mazzucato 2013; Mazzucato 
2016; Perez 2016), we can expect an increasing number of spaces in which neoliberal and 
developmentalist ideologies confront each other. Using a political economy lens on the Kenyan case 
is therefore important if we are to reveal how these kinds of confrontations have played out in this 
example, and for reflecting on how they might play out in other (confrontational) spaces in the future. 
3.2 Research Strategy and Methods 
The research for this paper was mainly desk-based, making extensive use of the material and analyses 
in our existing research on the evolution of the PV niche in Kenya (see, especially, Byrne 2011; Byrne 
et al. 2014; Ockwell and Byrne 2016a). This material was revisited to identify moments in that 'PV 
innovation history' where political economy dynamics would be most likely evident and, from these 
moments, we selected a small number for deeper research. In addition to these moments and the 
material already available to us, we identified the introduction of Kenya’s new constitution as another 
important development with potentially significant political economy dynamics. We conducted nine 
new interviews in order to derive new information relevant to the political economy of the selected 
moments. We spoke with two international NGO representatives, two private sector representatives, 
and five senior county officials. These supplemented the over 100 hours of interview testimony 
gathered from the previous work. As far as possible, we also made use of new documentary material 
in addition to that already gathered for the existing research. For one of the selected 'moments', which 
began in the mid-2000s and continued to the present day, we were unable to secure any interviews 
despite many attempts to do so. 
To help us re-analyse the previous work we reinterpreted our previous theoretical framework, niche 
theory, using the categories discussed briefly in Section 2 above: ideas, interests and institutions. In 
the next sub-section, we present this reinterpretation of niche theory before discussing how we have 
operationalised the concepts. Once we had operationalised our framework for a political economy of 
niche-building, we devised a list of questions for guiding the semi-structured interviews and for 
interrogating the material gathered from our previous research. With the consent of the interviewees, 
the new interviews were recorded and we made notes from the interviews rather than transcribing 
them. The identities of the nine new interviewees have been kept anonymous but those we 
interviewed for our previous work are named, unless they had requested anonymity during our 
previous work. Then, using our new analytical framework to revisit the empirical material already 
gathered, combined with the deeper work on key moments, we reconstructed a historical account of 
the political economy of Kenyan PV niche-building. This history is given in Section 4. 
3.3 Reinterpreting Niche Theory Using Ideas, Interests and Institutions 
Before discussing how we reinterpret niche theory using the categories ideas, interests and 
institutions, it is useful to give a brief account of its main concepts. A socio-technical niche can be 
considered to be a space in which experimentation and learning can occur as new technologies and 
other innovations are tested in real-world settings (Geels 2002; Raven 2005). An essential quality of 
such a space is that, although 'real-world', the new technology or innovation is 'protected' from the 
full force of market competition, where protection could take the form, for example, of a subsidy, or 
the new technology could be seen as a demonstration, or the innovation is the subject of a research 
project, and so on (Schot and Geels 2007; Smith and Raven 2012). The point of a protective space is 
to provide opportunities to generate learning rather than to assess whether an innovation is a success 
or failure. Learning, which can be of a first or second-order kind, can then inform further 
experimentation and further learning. 
9 
Over time, the technology or innovation is refined as increasingly robust facts and data are collected 
from various experiments (first-order learning) and the niche innovation is made to work in particular 
contexts (Hoogma et al. 2002: 28). If such refinements do not succeed in making the innovation work 
then there may be a fundamental rethink – a change of assumptions about the innovation – and a 
substantially new way of working with the innovation or different innovation becomes the subject of 
experimentation (second-order learning) (Byrne 2011: 23-4). For example, actors might be attempting 
to refine SHSs so that they work in a pastoralist context. Here we have what niche theory calls a socio-
technical expectation about SHSs, that these solar systems can provide access to electricity for 
pastoralists. This expectation then guides the kind of experiments undertaken – the direction of 
problem-solving and learning. At some point it might become clear that the semi-nomadic lifestyle of 
pastoralists concerned means that fixed SHSs are not necessarily the best solution. Instead, solar 
lanterns might be better. This, in effect, is a change of assumptions about which solar technology to 
test, second-order learning, and this suggests a different expectation: i.e. a change in the direction of 
problem-solving and learning (Ockwell and Byrne 2016a: 61-2). 
Whichever direction of learning is pursued, when the innovation is further refined so that knowledge 
about how to get it to work becomes increasingly clear, the expectation guiding the experimentation 
starts to become a socio-technical vision (Byrne 2011: 16-8). As experiments continue to be 
conducted, actors work with others and expand their networks, drawing in resources for further 
experimentation, learning and refinements (Raven 2005: 39-41). And, as they learn about a new 
technology or innovation in the real world, so they begin to define new practices, identify changes 
needed in various institutions (such as policies, laws, regulations) and lobby for these new practices 
and institutional changes. If they are successful in these attempts then this is referred to in niche 
theory as institutionalisation (Deuten et al. 1997: 132; Byrne 2011: 18-9). 
So, the essential concepts in niche theory are: protective space; experimentation and learning (first 
and second order); expectations and visions; actor networks; and institutionalisation. Tracing the 
interacting dynamics of these concepts in operation reveals the niche-building work that must be done 
to establish a new technology or innovation so that it might mount a challenge to a currently dominant 
technology or innovation. The point of analysing such dynamics is to learn how we can guide 
development towards more sustainable outcomes, for example to replace fossil-fuel based energy 
systems with renewable-energy based systems. Dominant (unsustainable) systems of provision are 
referred to as socio-technical regimes in the niche literature. And, it should be noted, a niche is not 
the same as a market. A niche consists of the empirically-identified set of actors who are working in 
some form of protective way to promote a new technology or innovation. A market, which may be 
part of a niche, is an outcome of the exchange of money for goods and services. With this brief 
summary of the main concepts in niche theory we can now turn to how we reinterpret it using our 
political economy lens. 
Niche theory does not have an explicit narratives category. However, expectations and visions are 
closely-related concepts. Further defining these, expectations and visions are conceptualised as 
cognitive representations of particular socio-technical futures: i.e. ideas about future configurations 
of technological artefacts and relevant social elements, such as practices, cultures, politics, etc. (see, 
for example, Berkhout 2006; Eames et al. 2006). But expectations and visions do more than just exist 
as ideas. They are deployed by actors in political ways, aimed at persuading others to adopt the same 
expectation or vision (Byrne 2011: 17-8). So there is something of an overlap between narratives, and 
expectations and visions. And narratives have been used successfully to analyse the evolution of 
expectations in the context of PV in the UK (see Smith et al. 2014). We can, therefore, relatively easily 
translate the material on expectations and visions that we gathered for the previous work into a 
narratives analysis. Moreover, as the previous work connected expectations and visions with the 
materiality of the PV niche evolution, we can also connect the narratives analysis with these material 
developments. This can also help us integrate the political economy category interests. 
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In terms of being able to use evidence from the previous work to reveal interests and interest-
construction, there are several overlapping niche concepts we can identify. Most clearly, expectations 
(and visions) apply, together with the category for learning. This is where we can see anticipated 
material developments (expectations and visions), and the interaction of anticipation and 
actualisation (through learning), especially in socio-technical experiments (which can be 
conceptualised to include projects, processes and events (see Byrne 2011)). But there is also a 
connection with the actor-network category in niche theory. One of the reasons for building networks 
of actors is that they increase access to resources of various kinds. Some resources may be financial; 
other resources may be political, as in political support for a particular technology; some may be 
knowledge resources, as in expertise about a technology. So, through this category, we can see to 
what extent interests are being (re)constructed, maintained, established, and so on. 
Table 3.1 Ideas, Interests and Institutions in Niche Theory 
Political 
economy 
Conceptual links with niche theory 
Ideas Expectations and visions reveal ideas about socio-technical futures, expressed 
in narratives, moral dilemmas provide persuasive forces 
Evolution of expectations and visions, and encounters with other expectations 
and visions, reveal politics and actors’ strategies 
Interests Experimentation and learning reveal how interests are constructed in the face 
of uncertainty and change, and how interests are materialised 
Evolution of actor-networks reveals shared interest-construction and the nature 
of resources sought and secured 
Expectations and visions are suggestive of interests and interest-construction 
(perhaps implicit through framing, for example) 
Institutions Institutionalisation reveals actors’ agency and constraints, traces institutional 
change 
Expectations and visions reveal the politics of institutional change 
Source: Authors 
The category institutions (and actors) is relatively straightforward in terms of making use of our 
previous work. Niche theory has a category for institutionalisation, and the niche literature generally 
takes a similarly broad view to the one described above of what institutions are. The main difference 
between the political economy and niche versions of this category is that the niche version is 
concerned with the process of embedding new or adapted institutions in socio-technical systems, 
whereas the political economy version is more concerned with the extent to which existing institutions 
enable or constrain actors’ agency. Nevertheless, the specific form of political economy we are using 
analyses the dynamics of a political economy through the co-productive interactions of ideas, interests 
and institutions. In this sense, we can draw quite directly from the institutionalising processes 
evidenced in the previous work. Likewise, niche theory has an actor-network category and so 
translation to the actor dynamics within the institutions concept we are using for our political 
economy approach is relatively straightforward. 
Table 3.1 provides a summary of how niche theory concepts can be translated to our political economy 
categories of ideas, interests and institutions. The next sub-section discusses how we operationalise 
these concepts for gathering new, and interrogating our existing, evidence. 
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3.4 Operationalising Ideas, Interests and Institutions 
This sub-section attempts to make explicit how we have operationalised the set of concepts discussed 
above. This brief discussion is organised according to the three political economy categories but we 
include reference in each category to where evidence from the niche theory categories detailed in our 
existing work on the evolution of the Kenyan PV niche can be found, as summarised in Table 3.1. 
We use narratives and framings as the basic tools to analyse ideas, drawing primarily on the evidence 
we have for the evolution of expectations and visions. Following Leach et al. (2010b; 2010a), we 
determine narratives in terms of the problem-strategy-outcome construction and so interrogate texts 
(documentary evidence and interviews) to look for these elements. To establish framings, we identify 
what actors, evidence, objects and abstractions (e.g. market forces) are discussed and how they are 
deployed. And the way framings and narratives combine can provide insight into the moral forces at 
play: what the normal order of things is; who the 'good guys' and 'bad guys' are; what the moral 
dilemma is we are compelled to judge and what the judgement is we are expected to make. 
Our conceptualisation of interests includes both the material and the political, and we have adopted 
the argument that interests are socially constructed rather than self-evident or known to actors before 
they act. From our previous niche analysis, experimentation and learning provide the primary source 
of evidence for interrogating how actors construct and materialise their interests. We operationalise 
interests in terms of the material and political resources available to an actor, and in which they have 
invested, paying attention to how an actor constructs their interests in co-production with evolving 
ideas and institutions in the face of change. Material resources include money ('in the bank', or 
anticipated from future financial flows and profits), hard investments (e.g. in technological 
infrastructure), and 'soft' investments (e.g. in contracts, knowledge and skills, business models and 
strategies, relationships). Political resources include formal institutional position (for example, 
politician, ministry official, cleric, NGO), informal institutional position (for example, opinion-leader, 
elder, head of household), and legitimacy and credibility (for example, the degree to which an actor is 
respected, consulted, and by which other actors). 
As discussed in the section on conceptualising a political economy of niche-building, the concept of 
institutions is already defined in operational terms. Formal institutions include policies, laws, 
regulations, standards. Informal institutions include cultural practices, social norms, values, and so on. 
But we are interested not just in identifying institutions, we also want to analyse how they enable or 
constrain actors and how actors attempt to change institutions. Here, we expect that there is a close 
interaction between institutions and narratives. From our previous work, we draw primarily from the 
niche theory categories of institutionalisation, and expectations and visions, to reveal the agency of 
actors and the politics of institutional change. As for the concept of actors, we take this to mean 
individuals or groups, whether those groups are organisational actors or alliances of some kind. We 
draw evidence from our previous work, most obviously, through tracing the evolution of actor-
networks but actors appear throughout: for example, they develop and deploy ideas, construct 
interests and seek institutional stasis or change. 
3.5 Questions for Guiding Interviews and Analysis of Our Previous Research 
Bringing the operationalisation of our main concepts together, we derive the questions to use for 
guiding the new semi-structured interviews, and for guiding analysis of the material gathered in the 
previous research. The first four questions relate to ideas, the next three relate to interests, and the 
final six relate to institutions. 
Ideas 
1. What is the problem-definition? 
2. What development strategy is being advocated? 
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3. What outcomes are those advocating the strategy claiming? What outcomes are those actors 
claiming if the strategy is not followed? 
4. What framing appears to be in operation? 
Interests 
5. What material resources are available to an actor? 
6. What political resources are available to an actor? 
7. How does an actor construct their interests in the face of change, bearing in mind their 
material and political resources? 
Institutions 
8. Who are the relevant actors and actor-groups? 
9. What formal institutions are currently in operation? 
10. What informal institutions are currently in operation? 
11. How do these formal and informal institutions constrain or enable the agency of different 
actors? 
12. What formal and informal institutional changes are different actors seeking, and why? 
13. How are different actors attempting to realise their preferred institutional changes? 
3.6 Summary of the Methodology 
In this section, we have presented a rationale for choosing the Kenyan PV niche as a case study 
relevant to the political economy of state-led transformations in pro-poor low carbon energy. In 
essence, our argument is that the case represents an example where actors with different interests 
and significantly different levels or sources of power have interacted to co-produce what is seen by 
many to be an exemplar of neoliberal development orthodoxy, but which we contend to be far more 
complicated than a private sector led phenomenon. As such, the case can reveal the messiness of 
policy making in particular places rather than assume deterministic outcomes based on the relative 
power of the actors involved, and so provide insights on how future confrontations between 
ideologies – neoliberal and developmentalist in this case – will play out as global policy ambitions such 
as sustainable energy for all and meaningful climate change mitigation are put into practice. We have 
constructed a methodology that allows us to reinterpret through a political economy lens our existing 
work on the Kenyan PV niche, supplementing this existing work with a handful of new interviews and 
new documentary evidence. As part of achieving this reinterpretation, we have attempted to translate 
niche theory concepts into those that constitute our political economy lens: ideas, interests and 
institutions. This tentative political economy of niche-building framework stands as one of the 
contributions of this paper. The next Section presents the case as a historical political economy of PV 
niche-building in Kenya. Following this, in Section 5, we present an analysis of the case using our 
political economy lens before concluding the paper in Section 6.  
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4. Case study: a Historical Political Economy of the Kenyan PV Niche 
The Kenyan market for SHSs has long been celebrated as a success, especially when compared with 
other developing countries (Hankins 1990; 1993; Hankins and Bess 1994; Acker and Kammen 1996; 
van der Plas and Hankins 1998; Jacobson 2004; 2007; Ondraczek 2013). Beginning in the mid-1980s, 
the SHS market became quickly established (Hankins 1990) and has grown rapidly during most of the 
period since, as can be seen in Figure 4.1 (Ondraczek 2013). The market is described by many analysts 
as unsubsidised (Ockwell et al. forthcoming 2017), providing an exemplar of the neoliberal mode of 
development wherein private sector actors deliver energy services through free markets to those at 
the bottom of the income pyramid (Prahalad 2006). However, as we demonstrate in our account of 
the evolution of the SHS market (and the more recent SPL market), the description of a private sector 
led development phenomenon is highly simplified. By taking a niche-building perspective – 
incorporating the range of activities various actors employed to build the actor-networks, institutions 
and capabilities relevant to creating a successful market – and doing so through a political economy 
lens, we see the extent to which different development strategies have negotiated each other over 
time in their encounters through technology experiments and policymaking. This reveals a much more 
complex array of dynamics than are suggested by the simplifying private sector story and, as PV actors 
continue to struggle to further develop the niche, it is unclear whether the previous successes in niche-
building will be maintained or whether stricter neoliberal ideas of development will triumph. As Kenya 
enters an uncertain period of energy governance under its new constitution, these dynamics may 
become increasingly complex with possibilities either for pluralising energy pathways or for opening 
new sites of contestation and conflict. 
Figure 4.1 Number of SHSs Installed in Kenya 1990–2010 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Ondraczek (2013: 409) 
 
4.1 Telling Tales: Constructing a Narrative of the Embryonic PV Niche 
Up until about 1984, there was no SHS3 market in Kenya. Solar PV equipment was available from some 
suppliers in Nairobi who stocked the equipment for the so-called 'project market' that consisted of 
installations for powering community and commercial services, for example rural clinics, vaccine 
refrigerators, school lighting and TV/VCR, water pumping, outdoor lighting, and telecommunications 
(Ockwell and Byrne 2016a: 73-5). The SHS market is said to have its beginning in a series of four PV 
lighting installations in schools around Mount Kenya, starting in 1984 and running into 1986 (Hankins 
2007). The first of these PV systems was installed at Karamugi Harambee Secondary School, where 
                                                          
3 The term ‘solar home system’ had not been coined at this time but we use it for simplicity. 
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Mark Hankins, a US Peace Corps volunteer at the time and later important actor in the Kenyan PV 
niche, was teaching science. In late 1983, Hankins had met with Harold Burris, an ex-Peace Corps 
volunteer who was looking to make a living in Kenya (he was married to a Kenyan),  and they had 
discussed the possibility of installing a PV lighting system at Karamugi instead of the school purchasing 
a diesel generator. After some persuasion, the school agreed to trial PV lighting systems in four 
classrooms (Ockwell and Byrne 2016a: 77). Within six months of the installation, the headmaster, 
several teachers and others in the local community wanted similar systems for their homes (Hankins 
1993: 32; Kimani and Hankins 1993: 93). Hankins showed the Karamugi installation to representatives 
from the Peace Corps and this excited interest from them in supporting further school installations, 
as Hankins recalls: 
The Karamugi installation was a coup: it involved some Peace Corps leaders coming to the 
school and talking about how this was a great thing. So there was definitely a sense that this 
was a great idea and so let’s talk to the people in USAID about it. 
Hankins (2007) 
Eventually, this led to Hankins and Burris working on a project to install PV systems in the three other 
schools in the series of four mentioned above. This time, the United States Agency for International 
Development (USAID) funded 50 per cent of the cost and the schools funded the rest (the Karamugi 
installation was funded by the school itself) (Ockwell and Byrne 2016a: 78-9). Both the Peace Corps 
and USAID had already shown a strong interest in supporting the use of renewable energy 
technologies in their development work. USAID had funded the installation of some of the community 
services facilities mentioned above (e.g. rural clinics and vaccine refrigerators), which was the result 
of an attempt to marry their interest in funding pro-poor electrification projects with a more general 
US interest to develop alternatives to a dependence on oil in its domestic economy (Byrne 2011: 61-
4). And the Peace Corps had been interested since 1979 in promoting renewable energy installations 
for community services (Peace Corps 1984). So a project to install school lighting systems powered by 
PV was clearly in line with the interests of both USAID and the Peace Corps. However, there was a 
stipulation that the installations be accompanied by the training of technicians, something which 
Hankins and Burris proceeded to develop. This installation-and-training combination then became a 
template that Hankins used extensively for many subsequent years in Kenya and elsewhere (Ockwell 
and Byrne 2016a: 82). And, just as had happened following the Karamugi installation, others wanted 
lighting systems for their homes after they had seen them installed in the schools. 
In response to the demand for home lighting systems that followed the Karamugi installation, Burris 
set up a business, which he named Solar Shamba, and 'got heavily into the marketing' (Hankins 2007). 
Later he also employed eight of the technicians who were trained in the subsequent USAID-supported 
three-schools project. Most of the others were employed by the Nairobi PV suppliers (Ockwell and 
Byrne 2016a: 79). With a number of companies now focussed on marketing SHSs in the area around 
Mount Kenya, and, especially due to the efforts of Solar Shamba, the market grew quickly over the 
next few years. Precise figures are impossible to determine or verify but there could have been as 
many as 500 SHSs installed by early 1987 (for various estimates, see Hankins 1990: 2; Perlin 1999: 135; 
Hankins 2001: 2). Despite this rapid growth, Burris became increasingly isolated from other actors in 
the embryonic PV niche – he was notoriously critical of the many actors he considered to be guilty of 
poor technical practice and thereby made many enemies – and he found it increasingly difficult to 
operate his business. Around the end of 1987 or early 1988, Burris left Kenya (Ockwell and Byrne 
2016a: 87). 
Hankins left Kenya around the same time as Burris but was looking for a way to return (Hankins 2007). 
In 1989, he began a master’s degree in renewable energies at Reading University in the United 
Kingdom (UK) and went to Kenya for his dissertation research. He found that the SHS market had 
continued to flourish and he was therefore able to survey a number of installations to find out how 
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consumers were using – and abusing – their systems (Hankins 1990). The dissertation documented 
how the supply chains were working and how people in rural areas were actually using the technology, 
which included some examples of productive uses as well as immediate improvements in the quality 
of their lives. He learned about some of the problems in the market, some of which were to do with 
technical issues and some to do with user practices. And he could point to the fact that thousands of 
systems had been sold through the private market (Ockwell and Byrne 2016a: 93). 
This last observation formed an important part of the introduction to Hankins’ dissertation, and it is 
here that we see what may have been his first attempt to articulate a coherent story of this Kenyan 
PV market phenomenon. Specifically, he says: 
In Kenya over 4,000 solar electric lighting systems were installed in rural homes between 1984 
and 1989. In the inoculation stages of the technology between 1984 and 87, about 500 home 
units were installed, and demand grew rapidly thenceforth … The phenomenal growth of the 
Kenyan market has occurred almost entirely on a commercial basis, as external aid has not 
played an important role in dissemination of home lighting systems, except for training projects 
involving rurally-based electricians. Prospective system buyers must pay in cash, as credit has 
not been available from any companies until 1989. 
With design improvements, credit availability, better local marketing, servicing, and consumer 
education, small lighting systems could meet the needs of rural people on a much wider scale. 
Hankins (1990: 2–3) 
According to Hankins (2007) the 'message' in his dissertation was 'picked up by the World Bank' and 
certainly, as we recount below, the International Finance Corporation (IFC) later implemented a 
project in Kenya to transform the scale of the market. But, more immediately, Hankins was able to use 
his findings to win funding for conducting further research into SHS markets in Kenya and elsewhere, 
publishing these in Hankins (1993) and in Hankins and Bess (1994), as well as writing a textbook of 
solar lighting system design (first published as Hankins 1991; updated in 1995; and then in 2010). 
Furthermore, together with Burris and the NGO Kenya Environmental Non-Governmental 
Organizations (KENGO), he won funding from the African Development Foundation to run a workshop 
in Nairobi in 1992 on installing SHSs, and this attracted participation from actors across East and 
Southern Africa (including some from the Kenyan Ministry of Energy) (Ockwell and Byrne 2016a: 92). 
Out of this workshop, Hankins had a number of project opportunities but had to implement them 
through a legal entity. He therefore started his own company, Energy Alternatives Africa (EAA), and 
this became a leading player in the PV market in Kenya, as well as in several other African countries, 
over subsequent decades. 
EAA developed and used the story of the Kenyan PV market phenomenon, which Hankins had begun 
to articulate in his dissertation, to win funding from donors for many PV projects over the ensuing 
years. Hankins and colleagues would identify a problem in the market and then construct an argument 
that the private sector – who, according to this argument, had led the creation of the market – were 
being hampered by the identified problem from developing the market further. The argument was 
then used to persuade a donor to provide resources so that the problem could be solved with an 
intervention of some kind. This was a successful strategy, winning resources from a wide range of 
donors for a wide range of projects. A selection of the projects, and their donors, included (for detailed 
accounts of these projects, see Byrne 2011; and Ockwell and Byrne 2016a): 
 building a solar training facility in Tanzania (funded by the Commonwealth Science Council, CSC) 
 running annual two-week training courses at the Tanzanian solar training facility (funded by CSC, 
Sida, APSO, Hivos, and Ashden Trust) 
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 developing solar batteries (funded by Ashden Trust and the World Bank’s Energy Sector 
Management Assistance Programme, ESMAP) 
 developing balance-of-system components such as charge regulators (funded by the Micro-
Enterprises Support Programme) 
 test-marketing solar lanterns (funded by ESMAP) 
 conducting increasingly large surveys on different aspects of the Kenyan and other solar markets 
(funded by ESMAP and the World Bank, amongst others) 
 experimenting with micro-finance for SHSs (funded by ESMAP and Ashden Trust) 
 formulating an alternative Kenyan energy policy (funded by the UK Department for International 
Development, DFID) 
In the process of implementing these and other projects, EAA worked with a wide range of PV actors 
in Kenya and elsewhere. According to Ockwell and Byrne (2016a: 98), for example, over the period 
from 1995 to the early 2000s, EAA worked 'with at least 39 different dealers and suppliers in 16 cities, 
towns and villages around Kenya, and at least five of the dealers were involved in more than one 
project'. In addition to these and the donors already mentioned, EAA worked with several local 
manufacturers and with a number of researchers from outside Kenya. However, the extent of their 
networking was not confined to the implementation of projects or hosting visiting researchers. 
Hankins had also started an informal network of local PV actors in 1992 – SolarNet – and this continued 
for many years, including the publication of a regular news magazine starting in 1998, only officially 
closing in 2010 (Byrne et al. 2014: 97). 
Throughout this period, Hankins and colleagues repeated in various publications and project proposals 
the basic argument that the Kenyan PV market was a private sector phenomenon, although they did 
give credit to donors – or aid – for supporting training. However, the story was often simplified by 
others, and descriptions of the market such as 'unsubsidised' often appear in accounts4 by various 
analysts (for example Jacobson 2004; 2007; Ondraczek 2013). In other words, beginning in 1990, 
Hankins and colleagues established the basic and enduring claim that the Kenyan PV market was 
private-sector led, and constructed a narrative around this that was used to attract resources to 
support their vision of SHS market development or, in our terms, to build a particular SHS pathway. 
4.2 Wishful Thinking: Seeking Market Transformation 
In connection with how Hankins’ MSc dissertation was 'picked up by the World Bank', during the early 
1990s the then recently established Global Environment Facility (GEF) was looking for project ideas to 
help promote renewable energy technologies in developing countries and eventually, together with 
the IFC, decided to try to scale-up the promising Kenyan PV market. Originally involving the World 
Bank and GEF, and conceived in terms of offering a prize for solar PV commercialisation, the project-
concept was passed to the IFC and redesigned around the notion of competitive procurement from 
private companies within selected countries (IFC 2007: 40). Over a period of about two and a half 
years, including some consultation with PV niche actors, the IFC developed a proposal for market 
transformation in three countries: Kenya, Morocco and India. In assessing the Kenyan situation, the 
proposal referred to what it described as a 'true free market for PV products' (IFC 1998: 12), suggesting 
that the IFC had adopted the simplified version of the story that Hankins and colleagues had 
constructed. It took another two years to gain approval but, in July 1998, the IFC began 
implementation of this Photovoltaic Market Transformation Initiative (PVMTI) financed by the GEF 
(IFC 1998: C1; Gunning 2003: 81). The initiative made finance of US$ 5million available on both the 
                                                          
4 One of the few exceptions is Jacobson (2004: 43–4), who provides a useful discussion of the debates of the time about 
subsidies. In essence, he argues that 'soft' subsidies were often not seen as 'bad', even by neoliberal policymakers. These 
kinds of subsidies could be construed as market development support in contrast to direct subsidies on PV module prices. 
17 
demand and supply sides of the Kenyan PV market, and was to be implemented over ten years. 
Finance for customers would enable them to overcome the high initial cost of PV modules, and 
therefore release pent-up demand. Finance for companies would allow them to purchase in bulk and 
so reduce their costs, hence lowering prices to consumers. In other words, PVMTI could be 
characterised as a 'hardware-financing' intervention (Ockwell and Byrne 2016b; 2016a). 
Although PVMTI did acknowledge various issues in Kenya that were hampering development of the 
PV market, the bulk of effort focussed on establishing finance deals. In principle, the initiative was to 
provide a range of support services in addition to securing deals, including capacity building and 
addressing poor-quality products (Gunning 2003). However, negotiations to secure deals proved to be 
arduous, protracted and, ultimately, fruitless (Ngigi 2008; and see Byrne 2011: 127-9, for a fuller 
account of these negotiations), and so perhaps there was little opportunity to provide the other 
support services initially intended. Only one deal actually saw the finance and installation of SHSs , a 
deal of US$ 600,000 agreed with the Muramati Tea Growers Savings and Credit Cooperative (SACCO) 
(Byrne 2011: 128). It had taken three years of negotiations between PVMTI and the Muramati SACCO 
to secure the deal but it began to fall apart after implementation started. There were technical 
problems with the batteries for the systems, and the SACCO was unhappy with the service provided 
by the technical partner (Rolffs et al. 2014: 17). Following a 'very bitter' meeting with the Muramati 
stakeholders, the project was wound up and the money returned (Ngigi 2008). Despite the initial 
promise of the deal, and initial enthusiasm amongst the SACCO members, only about 150 to 170 SHSs 
were financed (IFC 2007: 42). 
The protracted negotiations and continuing failure to secure deals led to increasing disquiet and 
impatience among local PV actors, and disparaging letters began to appear in the SolarNet news 
magazine (for example Bresson 2001: 5-6; de Bakker 2001: 4-5; Muchiri 2001: 4). And EAA, Hankins’ 
company which had been part of an unsuccessful proposal into PVMTI, became one of the project’s 
biggest critics (Ngigi 2008). As the disquiet and impatience hardened into resentment, local PV actors 
began discussing amongst themselves other ways in which PVMTI might provide some tangible benefit 
to the market (van der Vleuten 2008). In 2003, they approached PVMTI requesting help with capacity-
building (Magambo 2006: 1). The following year, as a result of this lobbying and as well as frustrations 
within the PVMTI hierarchy itself (Ngigi 2008), the project was restructured (IFC 2007: 42). There was 
already a widely-held acknowledgement of poor quality in the Kenyan market, and systematic 
evidence of technician-training and technical-quality needs had been gathered by Arne Jacobson5 
(Jacobson 2002b; 2002a). So PVMTI agreed to strengthen the capacity-building element of its original 
design, both in terms of the money available (as grants rather than finance) and in terms of a clear 
programme of activities (in contrast to the vague statements given in the original proposal). In June 
2006, the Kenya PV Capacity Building Project (KPVCP) got underway (PVMTI 2009) with a grant of USD 
350,000, together with 'in-kind contributions and co-financing' of US$ 115,000 (IFC 2007: 42). The 
KPVCP grant was used to support the recently formed Kenya Renewable Energy Association (KEREA), 
the development of a PV curriculum, PV training courses, the production of three manuals (user, 
vendor, and installer manuals), and a quality assurance programme (Magambo 2006; IFC 2007: 42; 
Nyaga 2007; PVMTI 2009). In October 2006, in addition to the grant money specifically provided for 
KPVCP, PVMTI increased the proportion of grant money allowed for general technical assistance from 
10 per cent to 20 pre cent of its US$ 5million budget (IFC 2007: 42). PVMTI was then extended to 2011 
and, according to Ngigi (2008), these capacity building efforts and resources helped redeem the 
project’s credibility amongst local PV actors. 
                                                          
5 Arne Jacobson was a student from the University of California Berkeley and had been in Kenya since the late 1990s 
conducting research for his PhD. He was also involved in various PV activities, including writing a column for the SolarNet 
magazine on technical tips for PV systems. 
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4.3 A Seat at the Table: Engaging with State Actors 
Overlapping with the implementation of PVMTI, local PV actors began to interact in substantive ways 
with certain parts of the Kenyan state. Perhaps the most notable of these interactions was with the 
Kenya Bureau of Standards (KEBS) through which local PV actors were central to efforts to develop 
Kenyan standards for PV equipment. But later interactions included attempts to influence national 
energy policy and the development of PV regulations. The extent to which PV actors have succeeded 
in influencing state actors is unclear. Some developments indicate a substantial influence, while others 
suggest that any influence has been superficial. State practice in regard to PV has been variously 
ambivalent, hostile, supportive or active. Official state policy has generally been vague and 
noncommittal, and has occasionally been undermining of PV development. 
Kenya’s first energy policy, formulated in 1987, included only cursory treatment of PV. In fact PV gets 
only two comparatively substantive mentions in the document: 
Solar photovoltaic energy (P.V.’s) can be used for water pumping, rural electrification, electric 
fencing, telecommunication systems, and micro-electronic devices. 
ROK 1987: 76 
To promote the use of [solar and wind] sources of energy the Ministry will undertake rigorous 
research, design, development and dissemination of these two technologies. Installation of 
solar and wind systems will be carried out for generation of electricity and water pumping in 
rural areas over the plan period [1987-2000]. 
ROK 1987: 103 
At this time the focus of the Kenyan energy policy was on cooking, energy efficiency in the industrial 
and commercial sectors, and transmission efficiency in the national electricity grid. The problem that 
the policy was intended to address was characterised as one of secure energy-supply for social and 
economic development, with an emphasis on economic growth. To address this problem, the strategy 
was to promote improved cookstoves and industrial energy conservation, and to reduce electric 
power system losses. Bearing in mind that the SHS market at this time was tiny, Hankins (1990: 2) put 
the number of SHS installations in Kenya in 1987 at 500, it is unlikely that state actors would consider 
it worth any attention in its energy policy, even if they knew of its existence. Some state actors did 
know something about PV, it would seem, as import duties of 45 per cent were removed from PV 
equipment in 1986 after lobbying, it is claimed, from the World Bank and private sector actors (Acker 
and Kammen 1996: 92; Jacobson 2004: 142). But, again, considering the small number of SHSs 
installed, perhaps this removal of duties was seen as inconsequential by state actors. Still, duties on 
solar modules were raised again in 1992 (to 53 per cent), then reduced in steps over the 1990s to zero 
in 2002 (Jacobson 2004: 142-3), and VAT of 16 per cent was imposed on solar goods in 2013 (Ockwell 
and Byrne 2016a: 122). 
This neglect of PV began to change in the period just before the development of an updated energy 
policy, the first since 1987, a draft of which was published in 2004 (MOE 2004). It is difficult to know 
for certain but it appears that some deeper interactions between PV actors and some state actors may 
have helped to create a somewhat more favourable and supportive official view of PV from the state. 
These deeper interactions began with the process of formulating PV standards, which got underway 
in April 1999 (Gisore 2002: 47-8). For this process, KEBS formed a small committee with about 12 PV 
actors, which spent a few years meeting regularly to discuss and deliberate on what PV standards 
would be appropriate for Kenya (Loh 2007). Whilst this was proceeding, the then Acting Director of 
the Renewable Energy Department in the Ministry of Energy (MOE), Daniel Theuri, collaborated with 
EAA on some background papers for an Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) project 
'Regional Household Energy Policy' (Theuri and Hankins 2000; Osawa and Theuri 2001; Theuri and 
Osawa 2001). And, through a process beginning in 2002, various PV actors, led by EAA, developed an 
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alternative national energy policy in parallel with the official policymaking process led by MOE (see 
Ockwell and Byrne 2016a: 112–22, for a detailed account of PV and state actor interactions around 
standards, regulations and energy policy). Although there were occasionally tense interactions 
between actors involved in the two policymaking processes, it would appear that the official policy 
did adopt some of the views of long standing PV advocates. This is apparent in some sections of the 
policy, which refer to the PV market in terms similar to those used in the well-established story of the 
private-sector-led phenomenon and various market failures constraining further growth. For example, 
MOE (2004: 19-20) repeats the, by then, long-articulated diagnosis of 'barriers' to PV market growth 
in Kenya: 
Among the constraints to accelerated market penetration are:  
 lack of legal and regulatory framework and institutional support to promote widespread 
use of solar energy and protect consumer interests;  
 high capital costs of the systems relative to consumer incomes. Despite gradual reduction 
of the indirect taxes by the Government over the years, the cost of solar home systems has 
remained beyond the reach of many potential consumers;  
 erosion of consumer confidence because of inappropriate system standards, faulty 
installations, importation of sub-standard systems and poor after sales service;  
 rising thefts of photovoltaic panels installed in rural homes, thus discouraging their 
purchase and by extension growth; 
 lack of awareness on the potential opportunities and economic benefits offered by solar 
technologies; and,  
 lack of appropriate credit and financing mechanisms to facilitate acquisition of solar 
technology by the rural population and urban poor.  
The draft policy later echoes the story of the private sector led phenomenon: 
Over the last three years, the number of [solar] home systems installed has grown at an 
average of 20,000 units per annum. This growth is attributable to aggressive marketing by the 
private sector with limited support from the Government in form of low taxes on panels. 
(MOE 2004: 31) 
Interestingly, although there is acknowledgement of a public sector role, the role of donors has 
completely vanished in this account. Other parts of the policy document also suggest a warmer 
attitude to PV compared with the earlier period, although it does not develop any specific strategies 
for PV beyond broadly supportive statements. In effect, the draft policy takes an enabling-
environment view of the challenge of PV promotion. That is, it takes a line that is in keeping with the 
still-present background free-market ideology, especially as articulated in the new institutional 
economics variety (Jacobson 2004: 43-4). 
This somewhat more favourable view of PV continues into the latest version of the energy policy; one 
that has been developed to accommodate Kenya’s new constitution, which splits energy policy duties 
between the national and county government levels. Whilst it does provide a list of strategies and 
policies intended to promote PV (see below), they are mainly in rather generic statements that echo 
the 2004 policy and are similarly concerned, in essence, with an enabling-environment (for example, 
standards and regulations, certified training, information for consumers) (MEP 2015: 58): 
1. Undertake awareness programs to promote the use of solar energy  
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2. Enforce regulations on standards.  
3. Regular review of standards for solar energy technologies and equipment.  
4. Provide incentives to promote the local production and use of efficient solar systems.  
5. Enforce regulations on building codes on water heating and lightning.  
6. Provide a framework for connection of electricity generated from solar energy to national 
and isolated grids, through direct sale or net metering.  
7. Enhance penalties for theft and vandalism of solar systems.  
8. Support hybrid power generation systems involving solar and other energy sources to 
manage the effects caused by the intermittent nature and availability of solar energy.  
9. Roll out installation of solar PV systems in all the remaining public facilities in the off-grid 
areas.  
10. Procure and distribute solar lanterns to light up rural, peri-urban and urban areas.  
11. Undertake RD&D on solar technologies. 
The only instrument introduced explicitly between the 2004 and 2015 energy policies that could be 
seen as active promotion of PV was the feed-in tariff (FIT) (MOE 2012), although the solar FIT has been 
criticised by local actors for being unattractive (see Newell and Phillips 2016: 45, who report that the 
former Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Energy is alleged to have lobbied to fix the PV FIT 
deliberately low so as to deter investors). 
4.4 Where Markets Fear to Trade: the State Gets Active in PV 
However, in 2005, the MOE did implement a significant PV programme (Hankins et al. 2009: 3), an 
Institutional PV Systems Programme, even though this was not signalled in the 2004 draft energy 
policy. As described in Ockwell and Byrne (2016a), the Programme seems to have emerged as an ad 
hoc response to pressure on the MOE from the President’s Office soon after Mwai Kibaki was elected 
President in 2002. According to this account, Kibaki had promised the people in the Northeast Region 
– an area of arid and semi-arid land with little electricity grid infrastructure and sparsely populated, 
predominantly by pastoralists – that they would get electricity upon his election. When the MOE was 
told to find a way to fulfil this promise, it is said that the only quick solution would be to use PV 
systems. The idea was to electrify schools and then to move onto other community services facilities. 
Whilst there have been problems with the programme (NGO 1 2016; NGO 2 2016), including 
allegations of corruption amongst state officials and the companies who installed the systems 
(Mutimba 2007; Otieno 2007), it has indeed electrified a huge number of remote schools and other 
facilities. By August 2016, more than 4000 schools had been electrified with PV systems, according to 
ministry data reported by Wanzala (2016), at a cost of billions of Kenya Shillings (KES). The precise 
figure is not known but see below for some partial estimates. And the 2015 energy policy indicates a 
continuation of the programme to complete electrification of all off-grid public facilities (point 9 in the 
list cited above from MEP 2015: 58). It is difficult to verify the number of school systems, but our own 
analysis, based on various Kenyan Treasury reports of sectoral spending, suggest the figure of 4000 
could be an overestimate. Figure 4.2 shows the results of our own data gathering, suggesting the 
number of installations to be closer to 3000, but this does not include the results for 2016. In the 
period between 2005, when the programme began implementation, and 2010, when the Treasury 
reports start, there were 150 systems planned for installation and the MOE was expecting to spend in 
excess of KES 600m (approximately US$ 8.5million at the time) (Mbithi 2007). The value of the SHS 
market in Kenya at this time was around US$ 6m per year, and so the Institutional PV Systems 
Programme represented an annual addition of about 30 per cent to this value (Ockwell and Byrne 
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2016a: 116-7). By 2014, Mbithi (2014) reports that about 1000 systems had been installed at a cost of 
KES 2billion (approximately US$ 23million). 
Considering the ambivalence that the Kenyan state had previously shown in PV, it is surprising that it 
suddenly initiated such a large publicly-funded programme. Of course, the power of the President 
played an important role, forcing the MOE to act quickly to do something. PV, it seems, was the only 
viable option to meet the President’s demands. But it is difficult to establish whether this was the only 
reason. No state actor agreed to be interviewed about the programme and so we only have comment 
from 'outsiders'. One of these suggested that the programme may have been seen favourably because 
of its scale (Private Sector 2 2016). Whereas SHSs tend to be small, say 20W to 50W each, the school 
systems were around 1kW each (and sometimes larger). Multiplying this by the thousands of schools 
in the programme means that scale has been achieved and that PV, in this context, begins to look 
serious when compared with small off-grid systems. 
As can also been seen in Figure 4.2, there was a significant increase in the number of installations from 
2013 onward. The reason for this sudden jump in system installations is explained by the Jubilee 
Coalition Government’s programme to supply laptops to every primary school child. This was a key 
campaign promise made by Uhuru Kenyatta (NGO 2 2016) and it is clear that his Jubilee Government 
(which came to power in 2013) has been serious about electrifying all primary schools in order to 
ensure the success of the laptop programme. But the laptop programme has suffered controversy 
over whether other educational needs are more important (Kiberenge 2013), its cost (Muindi 2013) 
and its viability (Ombogo 2013), as well as allegations that the procurement process has sparked 
battles between business interests politically connected to rival groups within the Jubilee Coalition 
(Ongiri 2014). 
Figure 4.2 Number of Targeted and Installed Institutional Solar PV Systems 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Compiled from sectoral reports. See National Treasury (2010-2016) 
4.5 Closing Down: Legitimising and Delegitimising Practices 
Returning to the interactions of PV actors with the state, in 2008, the KEBS committee on PV and wind 
began a process of developing PV regulations in response to disappointing results following the 
introduction of PV standards. There is no space to recount the detail of this process (for this, see 
Ockwell and Byrne 2016a: 119–22) but there are several points it is worth noting. First, it is interesting 
that PV actors themselves were supportive of developing regulations considering that they had initially 
wanted only standards. As Loh (2007) describes the standards making process and development of 
KEREA’s own code of conduct (KEREA 2005), in the early 2000s KEREA members thought it would be 
'better that the association has its rules and governs itself before the Government comes in and puts 
its hand into saying all these things and getting licenses'. But, in spite of some successes in the early 
2000s at removing low-quality modules from the market (Jacobson and Kammen 2007), poor products 
and practices continued to dog the PV niche. The regulations that were eventually agreed (in 2012) 
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included the requirement that every actor practising in the Kenyan PV market be licensed, and 
licensing was only possible upon successful completion of nationally approved testing (ERC 2012). 
Furthermore, there was a payment for a license and it was a requirement that the license be renewed 
annually (also with a fee). Fees varied depending on the class of license, from no cost (basic level) to 
US$24.00 (intermediate) to US$37.00 (advanced level) with renewal costing either US$7.00 
(intermediate) or US£10.00 (advanced). Fees for accredited training were expected to be about 
US$146.00. For some aspiring PV technicians these could be serious barriers to entry. But there were 
also question marks over whether the Energy Regulatory Commission (ERC), the licensing authority,  
had the capacity to manage the administrative burden that could result from implementation of these 
regulations (Ockwell and Byrne 2016a: 120), especially considering that the number of technicians 
already operating in Kenya was estimated to be more than 2000 (Ondraczek 2013: 409). 
These barriers to entry to the PV market highlight the second point of note. The PV regulations could 
be seen as the most codified and institutionalised form of a closing down process that got underway 
informally in the mid-1980s. At that time, closing-down dynamics were mostly discursive in the sense 
that Burris, for example, was vocal about those he perceived to be practising poorly. The introduction 
of standards and then regulations could be seen as increasingly stronger closing down devices, 
prescribing at a national level what was considered good practice. But notions of good practice are 
not technically neutral and incontestable. This is the third point of note. The deliberations in the KEBS 
committee included arguments over certain aspects of the regulations, the details of which had 
implications for different actors’ interests. For example, according to Mboa (2013), there were 
arguments over how long various product warranties should be, with the government and consumer 
representatives on one side arguing for lengthy warranties, and private sector representatives on the 
other arguing that lengthy warranties could put them out of business. Indeed, similar arguments were 
had during the standards process in the early 2000s (Gisore 2002: 49–50). 
The final point of note arising from the implementation of regulations derives from the three 
preceding observations when these are considered within the wider context of low carbon energy 
policy dynamics in Kenya. As Newell and Phillips (2016) argue, the dominant low carbon energy actors 
in Kenya are mainly interested in developing geothermally generated electricity. Grid connected 
geothermal electricity offers the potential to meet the needs of industrial users at scale and at low 
cost. As it is a low carbon form of energy, it also aligns with donor interests in promoting climate 
compatible development. The Kenyan Government is interested because it relieves the pressure they 
experience from the powerful manufacturing lobby and grid-connected consumers while providing 
large capacity increases to underpin the government’s economic growth ambitions. Off-grid small 
scale PV systems are of low priority in this context (recall the comments from Private Sector 2 2016 
about scale). PV regulations can be seen as a light touch act on the part of the state that is simply 
setting an enabling-environment for private sector activity rather than acknowledge an emerging 
niche in need of further nurturing. In a sense, the story of a private sector phenomenon, deployed 
successfully to attract resources for many years, may backfire on the PV niche. Regulations could 
reduce the number of local players in the market and, if donor resources and policy support are 
targeted predominantly at geothermal energy exploitation, strict closing down around what is 
considered good practice could constrain the kinds of experimentation that enabled so much learning 
within the niche. 
4.6 Pluralising Pathways: New Services, New Markets and New Capabilities 
But these dynamics are not guaranteed. Recent developments have opened new pathways for PV in 
Kenya (and elsewhere). Advances in lighting and battery technologies, in particular, have enabled the 
development of markets for SPLs. And the success of mobile banking in Kenya has stimulated 
experiments with business models for mobile enabled consumer finance for SPLs and SHSs (Rolffs et 
al. 2015). As with the earlier developments in the SHS market, donors have been crucial to the story 
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and they continue to be involved in various ways. Perhaps the most important in Kenya has been 
Lighting Africa, a project implemented by the IFC. However, unlike PVMTI, Lighting Africa engaged in 
activities more akin to niche nurturing than hardware financing. We do not have the space to discuss 
the detail of Lighting Africa’s activities (see Ockwell and Byrne 2016a: 126-9) but they amount to a 
concentrated and coordinated version of the accumulated efforts we have already discussed in 
relation to the activities in the Kenyan SHS niche during the 1990s in particular (see Section 4.1). 
Whether attributable to Lighting Africa or not, the market in Kenya for SPLs grew exponentially from 
almost nothing prior to the beginning of Lighting Africa’s intervention in 2007 to more than 2.3 million 
accumulated sales of quality assured SPLs in 2015 (Turman-Bryant et al. 2015: 6). Interestingly, the 
Lighting Africa project describes the rise of the SPL market in similar terms to the way Kenyan PV 
actors describe the rise of the SHS market, as a private sector led process for which Lighting Africa 
helped to create the enabling-environment. However, Ockwell and Byrne (2016a: 126-9) argue 
differently, listing the range of interventions Lighting Africa undertook: aggressive country-wide 
awareness-raising campaigns; development of, and lobbying for, quality-assurance of products; 
capability-building of technicians, testing facilities, businesses and finance institutions; nurturing of 
networks of actors; various pieces of market research on user-practices and on national policies; and 
more. Indeed, the Lighting Africa project got underway by awarding grants for developing SPLs using 
advances in lighting and battery technologies; something the global lighting industry had not done 
itself. 
Finally, as well as new PV pathways opening up around SPLs, PV module assembly has been 
established in Kenya. The assembly plant, located in Naivasha and run by Ubbink EA, began production 
in August 2011 (Oirere 2012). It was a long process to establish the plant (Kimuya 2013) but, as with 
the rest of the solar history in Kenya, it benefited from donor support. Half of the investment was 
provided by the Dutch Government and the other half was shared between the two private partners 
Chloride (a Kenyan battery manufacturer) and Ubbink BV (the Dutch parent company) that constitute 
this joint venture (Stuart 2011). It seems that the Kenyan Government was also supportive of the 
investment. It is not clear what support was provided but Mabonga (2013) suggests there may have 
been some in kind measure in regard to the cost of the land, and the 2011 budget announced, just 
ahead of the plant’s opening, that duties on the raw materials for making solar modules were to be 
removed (KPMG 2011: 7). Initially, Ubbink invested heavily in establishing its credibility amongst PV 
actors across East Africa, something it seems to have successfully achieved (Newell et al. 2014). And, 
by 2015, it had expanded its production into assembly of solar lighting kits under license from the 
German company Fosera (Ockwell and Byrne 2016a: 131). Inspired by the success of this investment, 
perhaps, there are moves to establish another manufacturing plant in a different county, following 
the (as yet uncertain) opportunities created by enactment of Kenya’s new constitution (County 2 2016, 
and see below for a discussion of the implications for counties of the new constitution). 
So, whilst the introduction of PV regulations may result in closing down around particular practices, 
with potential for stifling niche development and excluding some actors, there are also new pathways 
opening up around SPLs and value-adding production capabilities. It is too soon to tell who will benefit 
from these developments, and in what ways. Although increasing access to lighting services (and 
mobile phone charging) from SPLs is certainly of direct benefit to many poorer Kenyans, the 
exponential growth of the market is attracting many international actors. Some of the companies 
involved are foreign owned and so this could mean much of the value generated in the market is 
simply being extracted to overseas investors rather than substantially benefiting Kenyans. If the 
market continues to expand rapidly in Kenya and elsewhere in Africa then other, perhaps more 
predatory, international finance may find the potential profits attractive. What this could mean for 
the political economy of PV in Kenya remains to be seen. 
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4.7 State of Uncertainty: The New Constitution and Open Questions 
On 27 August 2010 President Mwai Kibaki promulgated the new constitution of Kenya (ROK 2010). 
Amongst many changes to Kenyan democratic institutions, the new constitution devolves a significant 
amount of power from the national government to the 47 county governments. In principle, the 
constitution devolves power as close to the people as is feasible, and this is expressed explicitly for 
the county level in Article 176(2) of the constitution: 'Every county government shall decentralise its 
functions and the provision of its services to the extent that it is efficient and practicable to do so'. 
Specific governance functions between national and county levels are designated in the Fourth 
Schedule of the constitution. For the energy sector, the national government has the function of 
formulating energy policy while energy planning is devolved to the county level. However, this 
arrangement is not necessarily fixed. The constitution has provision for transfer of functions between 
levels, either 'up' or 'down' the institutional hierarchy, set out in Articles 187(1) and (2). 
Implementation of the constitution was expected to take at least five years (Sihanya 2012: 18) and, 
certainly, the process is still underway in regard to devolution of powers to county government in the 
energy sector (MEP 2015: 113). Although the most recent draft energy policy provides some detail for 
the division of labour between national and county government levels, there is some evidence that 
the structure of energy governance in Kenya is proving to be contentious. According to our research, 
there are some officials at the county level who see the Ministry of Energy and Petroleum (MEP) as 
not necessarily implementing the spirit of the constitution. Rather than devolve powers to the 
counties, the MEP appears to see the counties’ task as implementing national energy policy (County 1 
2016; County 3 2016; County 4 2016). Of course, as interviewee Private Sector 2 (2016) notes, it makes 
sense that some functions of energy policy be coordinated at the national level. But the enactment of 
the new constitution appears to have created expectations that there will be more control over policy 
at the local level. And, clearly, this has implications for resource flows and their control, as much as it 
does for autonomy over energy developments. 
So whilst the constitution may hold promise for more decentralised energy planning and 
development, with potential to significantly pluralise energy pathways in Kenya, debate continues as 
to how the new governance arrangements will work in practice (Johnson et al. 2016: 12; Private Sector 
2 2016). Part of this debate, at least amongst the county officials we interviewed, arises from the need 
for greater clarity on the roles of both national and county levels in energy policymaking and 
implementation as well as a call for a more consultative relationship (County 1 2016; County 4 2016), 
although some counties seem satisfied with their level of participation (County 2 2016; County 5 
2016). There was, however, some ambivalence in regard to the level of participation or consultation 
(County 3 2016). In this last case it seems that the participation and consultations are largely informal 
(something expressed by other county officials) and this seemed to be unsatisfactory. Here, the call 
was for institutionalising the relationships more formally. 
Whilst there are emerging struggles between the national and county levels, there is also potential for 
something similar within each county. Not only has the constitution introduced new institutional 
arrangements between the national and the county levels, it has also introduced new structures at 
the county level. This then raises questions about how governance will actually be practiced within 
counties, especially in regard to how citizens will be included (Johnson et al. 2016). Amongst our 
interviewees working within county administrations, there appear to be several other points of note, 
especially in terms of our focus on pro-poor solar PV development. These include understanding the 
electrical needs of the poor, how PV is seen within county energy plans and by county politicians, the 
constraints on achieving adoption of PV amongst county populations, and working with non-state 
actors. 
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In terms of the first of these issues, the electrical needs of the poor, our interviewees were almost 
unanimous in their responses. Lighting was identified as the priority need for electricity according to 
four out of the five interviewees. However, when it came to the importance of PV in county energy 
plans, many respondents said that other needs were greater, at least in the minds of more senior 
county figures. For these senior figures, it is those issues with political salience that attract their 
attention. In some cases, the most politically-salient issue was water access rather than energy itself 
(County 3 2016; County 4 2016). Some of our respondents, who appeared to be keen on the increased 
use of PV, suggested that one way to raise the profile of PV amongst senior figures would be to connect 
water and energy issues together. The example given was to promote solar-powered water pumps 
(County 3 2016; County 4 2016). Whether the profile of PV can be raised or not, and whether it is 
relevant to poor households or other kinds of users, there was consensus on the constraints to 
adoption. Unsurprisingly, cost featured strongly here, as did other 'barriers' familiar to the PV niche. 
Prominent amongst these other barriers were low awareness of the technology and poor quality 
products in the market. 
In terms of strategies to overcome these constraints, working with non-state actors (the final issue 
discussed in the interviews) was seen as an important way to make progress. One county is already 
highly active in this regard, or has many ideas for how to proceed. County 2 (2016) has already signed 
memoranda of understanding with several private companies. It is also designing financing 
mechanisms for PV, plans to develop its own regulations to foster renewable energy promotion, hopes 
to provide subsidies for low-income households to get solar, and is in discussions with a private 
investor to open a solar manufacturing facility. Several interviewees mentioned that there were 
discussions to open solar power plants in their counties (County 3 2016; County 4 2016; County 5 
2016). However, one of the private sector actors we interviewed was cautious about involvement at 
the county level, citing heavy bureaucracy as an impediment to progress (Private Sector 1 2016). Civil 
society actors and donors are also focussing attention on county energy planning (Private Sector 2 
2016). The World Bank (County 5 2016), GIZ (County 3 2016; County 5 2016) and SNV (County 4 2016) 
were all named in interviews, and Private Sector 2 (2016) mentioned that DFID and the Kenya 
Association of Manufacturers are also active at the county level. 
As we can see, energy governance in Kenya has become considerably more complex since August 
2010. Moreover, even the formal institutions of governance are not yet settled. The Energy Bill of 
2015 – the document that would set in law the roles and responsibilities of the national and county 
levels in respect of energy policy, planning and implementation – had not, at the time of writing, 
completed its passage through the National Assembly (ROK 2017: 7). This, in itself, is creating 
confusion and uncertainty. But the spirit of the new constitution has also created expectations that 
counties may get much more autonomy over their energy futures or, at least, they will become more 
actively involved in determining their own energy pathways, through consultative relations with the 
national level. For its part, the national level seems intent on preventing significant decentralisation 
of energy policymaking power. As Private Sector 2 (2016) comments, these institutions are being 
formulated by actors at the centre and so it is unlikely that they will give up their powers so easily. 
However, developments on the ground are starting to move quickly. Some counties have already 
initiated a number of plans and partnerships, grabbing the opportunities that the new constitution 
seems to have afforded them. International donors and NGOs are also becoming active, helping some 
counties to devise their energy strategies, and some international investors are in the process of 
negotiating county-level deals. 
How all this will play out is, of course, open to question and debate. What will be the nature of 
relations, for example, between powerful donors, NGOs, international investors and capacity-
constrained county administrations? Will local people actually get to participate or will county level 
administrations replicate the notoriously corrupt practices seen for so long at the national level? To 
what extent will national energy policy begin to reflect the diversity of interests and needs of the 
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counties6 rather than treat the nation as relatively homogeneous? If these dynamics play out 
unfavourably in the eyes of either county or national level interests, what will be the effect on relations 
between the counties and the centre? These are just some of the many questions that arise as Kenyans 
struggle with moving to and understanding their new political economy of energy. 
4.8 Summary of the Case Study 
It should be clear from the historical political economy of Kenya’s PV niche-building that the story of 
a private-sector led phenomenon is highly simplified and that the success of the Kenyan PV niche does 
not, therefore, provide an exemplar of neoliberal orthodoxy in operation. Instead, it illustrates a much 
messier and more complex process of energy-pathway construction emerging from the interplay of 
the ideas and strategies of different actors. PV actors have managed to win resources to afford them 
the protective space to further their niche development goals, framing their arguments in terms of 
market-failures and enabling-environments, terms that resonate with neoliberal orthodoxy. State 
actors have tended to resist active policy promotion of PV but have been able to claim some virtue by 
also framing their support in terms resonant of neoliberal policy prescriptions, primarily in terms of 
providing an enabling-environment. However, contrary to this general position, state actors have also 
engaged in some 'developmentalist' action by spending large amounts of money to fund PV systems 
in public facilities and by favouring, it would seem, the introduction of module-assembly capabilities. 
International neoliberal policy makers – donors and others – have, interestingly, continued to espouse 
neoliberal orthodoxy whilst providing material resources for highly active interventions across many 
socio-technical fronts. 
As a result of this interplay, the still evolving PV niche has benefited from experimentation with 
technologies (for example, batteries, balance-of-system components, lanterns, ICTs), institutions (for 
example, practices, micro-finance, standards, regulations), business models, and the establishment of 
the module-assembly plant. It is unlikely that much, if any, of this niche development would have 
happened without donor support. Despite this mainly hopeful history of niche building, there are now 
several uncertainties facing niche actors. As they attempt to enforce closing down around 'best 
practices' whilst state actors and donors become more supportive of large scale renewable energy 
options such as geothermal, the niche may see fewer actors and dwindling resources for 
experimentation. As the PV markets (SHS and SPL) continue to grow, international finance may be 
increasingly attracted to Kenya with the risk that value adding activities will be located outside the 
country thereby undermining the evolution of the local niche. And, finally, there is uncertainty around 
how energy pathways will develop under the new constitution. 
In the next section we analyse how the interactions of the different actors at work in the Kenyan PV 
niche have negotiated the co-production of what we can now describe as a historical political economy 
of niche building.   
                                                          
6 Interviewee Private Sector 2 (2016) suggested that energy policy has been traditionally focussed on the 80 per cent of 
Kenyans who live on 20 per cent of the land area. The remaining 20 per cent of Kenyans living in primarily arid and semi-arid 
lands have, in effect, been told, 'Sorry, you’re on your own'. 
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5. Analysis: Explaining the Political Economy of Kenya’s PV Niche 
Having provided a largely descriptive account of the historical political economy of PV niche building 
in Kenya, we use this Section to try to explain analytically how and why the niche has taken the form 
that it has. In keeping with a political economy lens based on a discursive institutionalist approach, we 
analyse the case primarily through narratives but attempt to connect these to the institutional and 
material changes we observe in the case. Our case study began with an account of narrative 
construction in the embryonic Kenyan PV niche, and we ended the account of the niche’s beginnings 
with the observation that the narrative was used to win resources from donors for niche building 
activities. We begin our analysis with this niche-actor narrative, unpacking it in order to try to 
understand how it worked, why it was so successful and how it evolved. Following this, we examine 
the official Kenyan State narrative, its evolution and how it affected niche building. This analysis 
constitutes the second of our main contributions (where the first was our theoretical framework, as 
discussed in Sections 2 and 3). The two narratives, niche and state, have co-evolved, especially in later 
years, resulting from what may be understood as strategic actions by both sides in their attempts to 
negotiate different interests, within the context of neoliberal orthodoxy, as they try to realise their 
preferred development pathways.  
5.1. Evolution of the Narrative Promoted by PV Actors and the Impact on Niche-building 
Using the narrative structure of problem-strategy-outcome suggested by Leach et al. (2010a: 371), we 
can discern the generic form of the narrative that PV niche actors used to win resources for their 
activities. The problem was stated, in general terms, as, 'there is something constraining SHS market 
growth', and this was identified as a problem by, 'this means those in rural areas will not see their 
electricity access improve and so they will continue to be hampered in their efforts to meet their 
development needs'. The strategy to address this was to, 'experiment with a specific way to correct 
the market failure (or remove the constraint)', with an appeal to donor-involvement by arguing that, 
'this is of benefit to all those in the market and so should be funded by a public sector actor'. Following 
this strategy would then lead to an outcome where, 'the SHS market will grow more quickly and so 
more people in rural areas will gain access to electricity, thereby enabling them to meet their 
development needs'. We can refer to this as a 'market-failure' narrative. 
As we noted in our brief discussion of ideas earlier (see Section 2.1), for a narrative to make sense to 
its intended audience (for example, donors), it needs to be contextualised in terms that are readily 
identifiable to that audience. This can be done through framing the narrative and by infusing it with a 
moral force. In this case the market-failure narrative is framed by the use of the private sector 
phenomenon story. Here, we are shown what private sector actors have achieved in PV market 
development, numbers of unsubsidised SHSs sold, without assistance and in a difficult context. 
Included explicitly in this framing are individual actors (for example, private sector, actual and 
potential SHS customers, donors); individual wants and behaviours; individual skills and knowledge; 
technological hardware; specific policies or instruments (for example, taxes, duties); costs, prices and 
markets; supply chains; and, occasionally, the biophysical environment. Excluded from this framing – 
sometimes explicitly, sometimes implicitly – are collectives of various kinds: national electricity grid; 
collective provision of electrical services; public sector (to some extent); social goals (again, to some 
extent); and politics and culture. The narrative is infused with moral force by describing the benefits 
of electricity access and arguing that these benefits are being denied to some people. This sets up the 
moral dilemma. The normal order of things, increasing electricity access through a private market, is 
being disrupted by something, a market-failure. On each side of this dilemma there are 'good guys' 
(private sector PV actors, potential PV users, market forces) and 'bad guys' (a market-failure, a 
constraint). We are thereby encouraged to make a judgement in favour of supporting private sector 
actors and PV users by eliminating the market-failure or constraint. 
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It is uncontroversial to suggest that free-market orthodoxy featured strongly in donor thinking when, 
in 1992, EAA first began operating and Hankins and colleagues were looking to get projects funded. 
The narrative deconstructed above married what Hankins and colleagues perceived or diagnosed to 
be market development needs together with this free-market orthodoxy. Development actors such as 
the World Bank and others (for example, USAID, GEF, IFC, DFID) could be expected to identify with the 
moral dilemma represented by a disruption to increasing electricity access – support for increasing 
electricity access was in some way part of the mission of each of these actors and so we can be secure 
in suggesting such support furthered their interests – and be sympathetic to the market-failure 
diagnosis of the disruption. Moreover, the 'system' framing is expressed in neoliberal terms. It is highly 
atomistic, emphasising (heroic) individuals and their (individual) needs, behaviours, skills, knowledge, 
agency, need for specific pieces of technological hardware, blaming a specific instrument or barrier 
for a problem. From this perspective, once a single market-failure can be identified and a single 
market-correction suggested, a targeted intervention becomes relatively straightforward, attractive 
and actionable. 
It is likely that the strength and plausibility of the private sector phenomenon story was assisted by 
the fact that the market grew quickly in the period from the late 1980s into the early 1990s, providing 
Hankins with evidence that he deployed in much of what he was writing at the time (see Hankins 1990; 
1993; Hankins and Bess 1994 for example). It is not clear whether Hankins and other actors in the PV 
niche in Kenya who promoted this story and the market-failure narrative believed it to be true or 
whether they deployed it simply as a political strategy. In a sense, it is not important. The point, for 
our purposes, is that the narrative worked in effect as a political strategy. It persuaded a variety of 
donors to direct resources into the Kenyan PV niche, and to do so over a long period that enabled 
building of the niche along several socio-technical dimensions. In so doing, the narrative and 
interventions became something of a virtuous circle. In other words, the attempts to fix 'market-
failures' seemed to be working, making it easier to attract further funding to fix other 'market-failures', 
and all the while providing the convenient fiction that the market was unsubsidised thereby 
strengthening the veracity of the market-failure narrative. 
The implementation of PVMTI might have challenged the strength of this narrative, given that PVMTI 
was premised on the assumption that all that was needed was finance to transform the scale of the 
market – the main market failure that had been discussed for many years – but failed to effect any 
significant change. However, the private-sector-led story and the market-failure narrative have 
endured. Explaining this endurance entails examining how the market-failure narrative evolved. In 
effect, the narrative shifted from 'market-failure' to 'enabling-environment', reflecting what Jacobson 
(2004: 43) refers to as the neoliberal policymaking embrace in the late 1990s of new institutional 
economics and Woo (2004: 12-3) calls the 'Washington Consensus Mark 2'. Or, to use Woo’s pithier 
construction in describing the shift from Washington Consensus Mark 1 to Mark 2, the change from a 
'market-failure' to an 'enabling-environment' narrative reflects a move from 'get the prices right' to 
'get the institutions right'. To some extent, PVMTI embodied this shift in thinking. It was initially about 
finance deals that would lower PV module prices but became something closer to the 'get the 
institutions right' approach. Its later focus on capacity building (technical practices as institutions) and 
support for standards (institutional environment) demonstrates this. Of course, the reality was more 
complex than this. The initial focus was on establishing suitable finance models for PV (i.e. financial or 
market institutions), not just getting the prices right. For local PV actors, such as EAA, efforts to get 
the institutions right had been in play from the beginning. They had, at least, long-lamented poor 
practices, lack of standards and credit facilities. Before they persuaded PVMTI to restructure, they had 
already become involved in standards making and had engaged in an alternative policymaking 
process. It is easy to understand, then, that it would be a short step from the market-failure narrative 
to one that talks of an enabling-environment, without doing damage to the private-sector-
phenomenon story. 
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5.2. Evolution of the PV Narrative Promoted by the State and Its Effect on Niche-building 
As discussed earlier, the focus of Kenya’s first energy policy was on improving the efficiency of cooking, 
of industrial energy use and of electricity distribution. There was only cursory attention given to off-
grid PV. However, we can discern something of a narrative around PV, albeit mostly implied. The policy 
stated that PV 'can be used for water pumping, rural electrification, electric fencing, 
telecommunication systems, and micro-electronic devices' (ROK 1987: 76) and so its potential for 
offsetting reliance on wood and petroleum was acknowledged. But, drawing from discussions in other 
parts of the policy document, we can infer that PV was considered expensive, unfamiliar, immature 
and risky. The strategy, in relation to PV was therefore that the Ministry would 'undertake rigorous 
research, design, development and dissemination' of PV (ROK 1987: 103) in addition to installing 
systems for electricity generation and water pumping. The outcome was unspecified but we might 
assume the aspiration was that the Ministry would gain better knowledge of PV, as well as succeed in 
developing the technology so that it was appropriate to Kenya’s needs at some indeterminate point 
in the future. In general, this appears to be a supportive stance but the budget allocation for the plan 
period (1987 – 2000) was just 0.26 per cent of the total for all energy activities, and this was shared 
with wind power (ROK 1987: 104). 
We could state the problem-definition of the narrative, then, in the form, 'PV has potential but it is 
expensive and we are largely ignorant of its suitability for Kenyans in off-grid areas', where the strategy 
is to, 'undertake research, design, development and dissemination'. The immediate outcome would 
be that the, 'Ministry has better knowledge about PV and so will be able to make decisions about how 
it should feature in Kenya’s energy plans'. We might call this a 'knowledge gap' narrative. But, as with 
the PV niche narrative, we also need to consider its framing and the source of its moral force. The 
framing was relevant to actors within the state, as the policy was never made public. As such, the 
government was certainly included within the frame (at both the national and district levels), as were 
the off-grid population, PV technologies, the enabling institutional environment (tax incentives, 
standards, testing facilities, legislation), the market, private sector actors and the biophysical 
environment. Outside the frame were donors, NGOs and community action. Although perhaps weak, 
the moral force of the narrative derived from the potential for PV to contribute to socio-economic 
development in rural areas being hampered by its high cost and the ignorance of its suitability. Here, 
the normal order of things (socio-economic development for all Kenyans) that could be maintained or 
enhanced by the 'good guys' (government and, potentially, PV) was being disrupted by the 'bad guys' 
(high cost, ignorance, poverty, inequality). Considering the primary audience within the state may 
have been the finance ministry, and the main focus of attention in the policy was cooking, industrial 
energy use and the efficiency of electricity distribution, the comparative weakness of the knowledge 
gap narrative helps to explain why the budget for solar was so small. With minimal resources to 
deploy, and without a compelling case for investing much effort in PV, it is easy to see why the state 
was indifferent to the technology, its most supportive act being the removal in 1987 of VAT on 
modules. 
The second energy policy, published in 2004, saw some evolution of the PV narrative. PV continued to 
be a minor concern relative to other issues and technologies but, by this time, there was something 
of a significant level of adoption of SHSs. According to MOE (2004: 31), there were about 200,000 SHSs 
installed in Kenya at the time. And, as we discussed earlier, PV actors had interacted with parts of the 
state when they became involved in the process to develop PV standards, as well as during the 
formulation of the 2004 policy (albeit controversially). These developments do seem to have had an 
impact on the official PV narrative. It was now more assured in that there was more knowledge about 
the relevance and suitability of PV. So, the problem-definition became of the form, 'off-grid electricity 
access using PV is being constrained by the lack of a fiscal and regulatory framework', giving rise to 
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the strategy of, 'establishing an enabling-environment to incentivise private sector investment in PV'. 
The outcome could be described as, 'realising wider and deeper off-grid electricity access using PV for 
more equitable and environmentally-friendly socio-economic development'. So, as with the PV niche 
actors, the state had adopted a similar form of the 'enabling-environment' narrative. 
The audience for this policy was public, in contrast with the 1987 policy. And, it is claimed (Mutimba 
2007; Otieno 2007), as there was donor (GTZ) and development-actor (UN Development Programme) 
pressure to include supportive text on renewables, there may have been a degree of strategic action 
on the part of the state to create opportunities for increased flows of aid. Included in the frame were 
the government (only at the national level), private sector actors, PV technologies, the enabling 
institutional environment, the market, the off-grid rural poor, the biophysical environment and, in an 
extension of inclusivity from the previous policy, NGOs and community action. Excluded from the 
frame, once again, were donors, at least in the sense of not being mentioned. The moral force of this 
narrative was perhaps stronger than in 1987. The 'good guys' had managed to achieve something 
tangible by this time: the story constructed by PV niche actors of the private sector phenomenon had 
been adopted in the policy; and the government claimed a small supportive part in this story in terms 
of removing taxes and duties from PV equipment. This normal order of things was being disrupted by 
the 'bad guys' of high costs, poor quality equipment and technical practices, theft of modules, low 
awareness amongst potential PV users, and so on. As we have already discussed, the aim of the 
established 'Washington Consensus Mark 2' orthodoxy, promoted by many donors, development 
actors and developing-country governments (at least, rhetorically), was to create enabling 
environments for private sector investments in free markets. And, as we have seen, PV niche actors 
themselves supported this approach. So, it is unsurprising that the 2004 energy policy prescribed this 
as its main strategy for promoting PV, with the addition of some resources for research (in line with 
statements made in the 1987 policy). It is unclear whether any research has been done by the Ministry 
but there were indeed efforts to develop and enhance the institutional environment. There was 
restructuring of the regulatory institutions, including the introduction of PV-specific regulations, and 
the setting of FITs. PV featured in FITs eventually, suggesting a warmer attitude to PV than had 
previously been evident. But this official stance was undermined by the, alleged at least, deliberately 
low level of the FIT for PV. 
However, this analysis fails to account for the sudden introduction of the Institutional PV Systems 
Programme that began with off-grid schools and expanded into other off-grid public facilities. This 
programme could not be described simply as either establishing an enabling-environment or 
undertaking research. We have already commented that presidential power played a role in creating 
the programme. And one interviewee suggested, the programme may have strong support in the 
Ministry because PV could be implemented at scale, in contrast to SHSs, which for the state appear to 
be a marginal solution for rural electrification. Both of these may be so but they do not explain the 
process of moving from the President’s instructions to the creation of this specific programme. What 
may explain this process is that the President’s instruction forced the Ministry to reframe its narrative 
around PV for off-grid rural electrification, both geographically and temporally. That is, the President 
had promised the Northeast Region particularly that it would be electrified (the geographical 
reframing of the narrative), and that this would happen upon his election (an injection of urgency into 
the temporal framing of the narrative). Establishing an enabling-environment for attracting private 
investment into the sparsely populated Northeast Region, where there was little electricity 
infrastructure, would likely have seemed inadequate for achieving rapid electrification. PV systems 
may have seemed the most viable when the problem definition was framed in this way. Pilot 
installations were at least a partial success and so it may have seemed appropriate to then roll out the 
programme to schools and public facilities in other parts of the country where a grid connection was 
an unlikely reality in the short to medium term. With the introduction by the Jubilee Government of 
the laptop programme, there was fresh impetus to achieve PV electrification of all off-grid primary 
schools, at the very least, in a short timeframe. 
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The most recent energy policy, published in final draft in 2015, maintains the 2004 PV narrative along 
with the same strategy of establishing the enabling-environment and undertaking research. But the 
framing is different in two ways. First, NGOs and community action rejoined donors outside the frame 
and, second, 'government' includes the national and county levels of government (a similar approach 
to the 1987 policy with its national and district levels). The only additions are an explicit commitment 
to complete the Institutional PV Systems Programme and inclusion of a commitment to 'procure and 
distribute solar lanterns' (MEP 2015: 58). This last inclusion is curious as it is the only place in the policy 
where solar lanterns are mentioned. There is no prior discussion and no elaboration to indicate what 
the commitment means. The final point to note is that there is much more confidence about the size 
of the PV market, with a projection to 2020 of 100MW installed capacity – a huge increase on an 
estimated 6MW as of the end of 2014 (MEP 2015: 57). The source of this optimism may be the success 
of the solar lantern market and the positive effect this has had on SHS sales (Rolffs et al. 2015). Indeed, 
one of our interviewees suggested that these successes have caused the Ministry to believe that PV 
can be implemented at scale, even in the form of SHSs, and spoke of early discussions between the 
Ministry and the World Bank to develop much more active policy instruments for PV once the current 
policy has passed through the National Assembly and received Presidential assent (Private Sector 2 
2016). 
5.3 Summary of our Political Economy Analysis 
We see that the narratives at play in both the PV niche and amongst state actors have evolved, as 
have their system-framings, as both sets of actors have negotiated with each other and with 
international neoliberal policymakers and development actors. Niche actors developed and employed 
for many years a market-failure narrative; state actors began with a somewhat implicit narrative 
framed as a knowledge gap. Both sets of actors have converged on a narrative that privileges an 
enabling-environment, although it is not clear the extent to which either set of actors believes the 
narrative to be true or whether they are deploying it strategically, each with their own understanding 
of what it means and how its realisation would promote their respective interests. In any case, there 
have been more or less successful material and institutional changes, some of which have been clearly 
beneficial to niche building whilst the implications of others remain uncertain. It would appear, 
however, that state actors have moved the furthest in accommodating, if not adopting wholesale, the 
thrust of the niche narrative. Whether this turns out to be indicative of a general trajectory of change 
in government policy – increasingly supportive of niche-building – or whether this is a short term 
strategic move remains to be seen. But we do see that certain kinds of alternative framing can have a 
significant effect on action, especially if married with the power to act. The government’s sudden 
embrace of PV for electrifying off-grid schools and other public service facilities demonstrates this. 
Under the new constitution, where counties may increase their powers to act, the changed spatial 
framing of energy plans, to the county level rather than the national level, could open up many new 
energy development narratives and associated pathways. Of course, the enactment of the new 
constitution could, instead, create a multitude of new confrontations as international, national, 
county-level and PV niche actors all engage in promoting their particular narratives in an increasingly 
complex and crowded energy development discourse. 
In the final section, we reflect on what our history of the political economy of PV niche-building in 
Kenya can tell us, what it could mean for the future of the Kenyan niche, and what it could mean for 
the ways in which global and local forces will interact in the process of implementing policy ambitions 
such as sustainable energy for all and climate change mitigation. 
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6. Discussion and Conclusions 
Our case alerts us to the need to consider niches as embedded in a web of relations through which 
some actors deploy their material power to shape what development pathways are possible, rather 
than see niches only as self-contained protected spaces of experimentation. Whilst protection of the 
Kenyan PV niche has certainly been given, and has been crucial to nurturing the development of a 
wide array of its socio-technical dimensions, the winning of resources to afford that protection during 
its embryonic period necessitated what we could interpret as strategic compromise on the part of its 
pioneering actors. The market failure narrative, constructed in the early 1990s, can be seen as an 
attempt to attract resources for highly active niche-building by strategically framing niche-building 
needs in terms favoured by what Jacobson (2004: 43) calls 'neo-liberal policy makers'. Actors such as 
the World Bank and GEF were sympathetic to market development approaches in which 'soft 
subsidies' could be used for 'limited interventions' to 'overcome barriers' to the effective operation of 
free market institutions. For the niche, this strategy seemed to work well, allowing niche actors to 
avoid dependence on an indifferent state or to make use of these neoliberal policymakers for 
pressuring the Kenyan state into adjusting specific policies (such as unfavourable taxes and duties on 
PV equipment). However, over time, the story of a private sector phenomenon – the founding myth 
of the niche, perhaps, and central to the market-failure narrative – seemed to become established 
fact, at least for neoliberal policymakers, new market actors and many analysts. This uncritical 
adoption of the niche’s 'founding myth' led to reconstructing the market failure narrative into one of 
an enabling environment, where the rules of the game are privileged above wide ranging active 
interventions. Niche and state actors seemed to converge on this narrative, perhaps because of close 
interactions between them during the standards making process but also because of pressure (on the 
state, at least) from powerful development actors during the process of formulating Kenya’s second 
energy policy. In any case, the resulting 'enabling-environment' of increasingly stringent rules 
legitimises some practices and actors, and marginalises others, with implications for which 
development pathways are realisable. 
Such technocratic processes may give rise to some beneficial outcomes – SHSs that perform in 
accordance with technical claims, for example – but they also raise classic questions about who is in 
control, whose interests are served and whose are marginalised. With both the PV standards and the 
regulations making processes, for example, we saw that deliberations included weighing local business 
interests against technical performance requirements that may serve the interests of SHS owners. 
Negotiating these trade-offs may be entirely sensible but they are not purely technical choices 
amongst which there is a calculable optimal outcome; rather, these are political choices. Deliberating 
them within opaque technical procedures raises other questions of transparency and accountability, 
and brings us back to the point about a web of power relations. We could argue that free market 
orthodoxy (of the Washington Consensus Mark 2 variety, see Woo 2004) has been, in effect, gradually 
forced on actors in Kenya, both niche and state, by 'neoliberal policymakers' wielding their material 
power. At the national scale, for example, this has taken the form of electricity sector reform (World 
Bank pressure for privatisation, liberalisation, for example), while for the PV niche it has taken the 
form of finance and funding for what such policymakers have deemed appropriate 'market 
development' interventions (many different development actors have converged on supporting 
'enabling-environment' policies). Accompanying the use of this material power, narratives have played 
a role in the process of what Newell and Phillips (2016) call 'disciplinary neoliberalism'. The market-
failure and the enabling-environment narratives obscure the importance of the collective, relational 
and systemic phenomena that are crucial to innovation processes and to nurturing social change. 
Celebrated, instead, are atomistic notions of heroic individuals and deterministic technologies. The 
complexities of politics, culture, social practice, and so on, are reduced to barriers that must be 
overcome so that (heroic) entrepreneurs can harness free-market forces to deliver technical fixes for 
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social injustices. But, it has not only been the disciplinary action of neoliberal policymakers that has 
worked through the web of power relations, examples such as the standards committee hint at ways 
in which these power relations can operate amongst actors ostensibly working for shared goals. 
Returning to the Kenyan PV narratives, the convergence of the niche and state narratives around an 
enabling-environment may be somewhat illusory. Niche actors may have been co-opted into 
neoliberal ideals or they may (still) be using the narrative strategically. Perhaps it is their calculation 
that it is the best they can achieve and they are hoping they can usher in more active niche building 
activities under its cover. State actors may also be acting strategically, using the enabling-environment 
narrative as a way to display their virtue in supporting PV markets while avoiding public funding 
commitments to a technology they do not take seriously. Moreover, the rent-seeking opportunities 
afforded by small scale SHSs are insignificant compared with those afforded by large scale centralised 
power plants. Geothermal power does seem to be the favoured low carbon option amongst state 
energy elites. Here, the state is willing to bear serious risk, providing resource exploration and 
mapping support through the state owned Geothermal Development Company (Newell and Phillips 
2016: 45), while nothing approaching this kind of support has been forthcoming for SHSs. Whilst we 
are not alleging that rent seeking is happening with respect to geothermal power, the contrast in 
opportunities between it and the off-grid PV market is obvious. Where the state has provided 
generous support for PV, in the Institutional PV Systems Programme, there have been allegations of 
rent seeking behaviour. This was a centrally managed programme involving large procurements of 
equipment, not as significant as a power station but in which it was certainly easier to engage in 
corrupt behaviour than in the decentralised SHS market. But, aside from the potential for corruption, 
the preference amongst state elites for geothermal is important to niche actors because it highlights 
that they are in a somewhat precarious position, despite their apparent proximity to policymakers. 
Donors are also interested in supporting geothermal power and so there is a danger that the hard won 
gains in the PV niche could wither if the resources necessary for its further nurturing are directed to 
other interests. Again, this raises questions about whose priorities matter, who is in control, whose 
interests are served and whose are marginalised. 
Having highlighted the risk to the PV niche, we want to draw a distinction between it and the PV 
market, as we noted in Section 3.3. We conceive of the niche as a network of actors, mainly local, who 
are building increasingly sophisticated socio-technical capabilities relevant to PV in Kenya, such that 
they can increasingly indigenise these capabilities. In the process, they can expand and extend the 
economic and human development benefits of a flourishing PV market contributing to Kenya’s 
development needs and goals. We conceive the PV market as the exchange of money for PV 
equipment and services. The two conceptions are not mutually exclusive but the niche could wither 
in important ways while the market flourishes. And the market is flourishing. This is attracting a 
growing number of international actors, including those in international finance. The risk here for the 
niche is that the narrow focus on an enabling-environment simply means this kind of international 
engagement will become increasingly extractive, leaving only the least valuable parts of the supply 
chain in the hands of local actors. In such a scenario, while many Kenyans would benefit directly from 
the artefacts sold in the market (SHSs and SPLs, for example), a withering niche could yield more and 
more control to international finance and technology players, risking further disciplinary 
neoliberalism. 
But we should also be cautious in assuming that disciplinary neoliberalism will triumph without 
problems. The actions of neoliberal development actors have been somewhat contradictory in Kenya. 
Although they have been espousing a focus on 'getting the institutions right' they have also been 
providing resources for more active nurturing of the Kenyan PV niche. Looking at the activities of 
Lighting Africa, for example, we see them promoting a neoliberal narrative while actively engaging in 
niche development. Likewise, returning to the international architecture for mitigating climate 
change, there are elements of the UNFCCC Technology Mechanism that could be used for active niche-
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building (Ockwell and Byrne 2016b) although it is far from certain that these elements will be fully 
developed. But even the cheer leaders of neoliberal orthodoxy, the World Bank, are supporting what 
may be much more activist approaches. Together with DFID and others, the World Bank was 
instrumental in setting up a Climate Innovation Centre (CIC) in Kenya (and is doing so in several other 
developing countries). Once again, the narrative promoting CICs is neoliberal but there is potential for 
the practice to be actively supportive of niche-building. Perhaps, therefore, Kenyan PV niche actors 
are right to believe that they can adopt the rhetoric of enabling-environments whilst continuing to 
find ways of attracting donor resources for further nurturing of the niche. 
Interestingly, as the Institutional PV Systems Programme demonstrates, when developing-country 
governments are able to direct their own resources rather than rely on assistance from international 
development actors, there is the possibility to ignore many of the tenets of neoliberal policy 
prescriptions. In the Kenyan case, notwithstanding the various problems and controversies it created, 
the programme could be seen as an example of reaching the poor most directly with electricity 
services. Kenya is not the poorest of developing countries, of course, but even so the programme 
illustrates that there may still be space for the developmental state. 
Finally, and constituting the third of our main contributions, the approach we have taken in this paper 
has enabled us to observe how global and local forces interact in relational terms to co-produce 
specific development strategies and outcomes, rather than to assume that powerful global forces are 
deterministic of development pathways. Treating the state and development regime in terms of 'a 
dispersed ensemble of institutional practices and techniques of governance' (Hansen and Stepputat 
2001: 14), rather than monolithic entities, has allowed us to examine the messy realities of 
policymaking and implementation in which actors from different groups co-produce development 
pathways through negotiation of complex socio-political relations (Scoones 2016: 307). The resulting 
development pathways cannot easily be characterised as led by any particular group or thing: 
technology, market, state or citizen. Instead, in the Kenyan case at least, all have been involved in 
different ways at different times in what might be described as a dynamic alliance, albeit sometimes 
an uneasy one. Over time, there have been increasing benefits accruing to the poor – in terms of 
access to useful socio-technical artefacts – but there are now uncertainties over which direction of 
development will dominate. Pessimistically, the continued promotion of neoliberal rhetoric, espoused 
in this period of financial constraints and increasingly isolationist states, may result in dwindling 
resources for niche-construction while promoting the expansion of the most predatory forms of 
neoliberal capitalism. Optimistically, despite neoliberal rhetoric, we see even the centres of neoliberal 
orthodoxy practising in ways that could strengthen niches of pro-poor energy access and, potentially, 
transformations. 
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